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Opinion: Adrian Orr responds to critics of NZ Super Fund
By Adrian Orr
There has been plenty of commentary about the purpose, current performance, and investment practices of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund in recent weeks. Should it exist, does it make sense to borrow to invest, should more go into New Zealand, and in these times should we take a contributions "˜rest'?
These are all decisions the Government must make and it is not the role of the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation to make them. Instead, we operate to the legislation of the day. What is that?
The Fund is a simple concept. The Guardians are legislated to invest money today to gain a return over the long-term. That return is to be used in the future to smooth the tax burden of the rising cost of New Zealand Superannuation.
The Guardians guiding legislation was established to enable this to occur "“ providing known capital inflows, operational independence, a commercial and prudent investment requirement, and a long horizon and near universal set of investment choices.
Underlying it is the principle that a government is in a great position to benefit from investing over decades, more so than an individual. It can focus on the long-term and hence make investment decisions not available to many. It has the ability to ride out the tough patches and avoid "˜fire sales'. And, it can fund this activity at the cheapest rate and receive the tax on its local investment.
This is the same whether a government's operating accounts are in surplus or deficit. And, the returns to the Fund from year-to-year do not impact meaningfully on the government's debt program "“ the capital contributions formula sees to that.
In other words, the chance of investment success is as good as it can get "“ but it is not risk free. Unfortunately, putting money only into cash or government bonds dooms the Fund to failure from the outset. The future retirement income liabilities, which follow nominal wages, will outpace the returns.
The Fund is invested for the long-term across a very wide range of growth assets globally (listed and unlisted equity, property, timber, infrastructure, commodities, and credit). These are the assets that give us the best chance of achieving our purpose.
For example, the earnings prospects for long-term investors have improved significantly recently. This is not denying we are in for tough economic times. Precisely, the global recession has seen asset prices fall and the rewards for accepting investment risk rise to historic levels. Recession is priced into these assets. However, markets are forward looking, but not necessarily long-term in focus. History teaches us that the best time for investment returns is after significant downward corrections, for those able to stay the distance.
While uncomfortable in terms of printed marked-to-market returns, it is a good strategic position for the Fund to be in, as a long-term investor with the majority of contributions ahead. Averaging in to an equity portfolio at low prices is an important component of success.
Purposely we do not manage the portfolio around expectations of near-term events. It is just about impossible and leads to a lot of cost and lost opportunities. Exactly when a boom or bust will happen, what will trigger it, how it will unfold, and what the investment implications might be can not be forecast with useful precision "“ otherwise they would not happen. Instead diversification is the best means of managing investment risk. And it has not failed. Imagine if you only invested in Lehman Brothers shares?
If our returns are ahead of the Government borrowing rate over the next 20 years, economic value has been added and the tax smoothing role of the Fund can be achieved. The Fund will not be called on for capital outflows until 2027.
Our financial performance is thus measured in decades - not some randomly selected day, week, month, or year. Our short five year history to date highlights some of the twists and turns we can expect. This is the volatility that long-run investors endure and what throws up the opportunities. Our Annual Report and other background material highlight this explicitly www.nzsuperfund.co.nz.
Meanwhile, we remain a very active investor in New Zealand. Currently approximately 27% of our assets are here. In some cases New Zealand assets are favoured over their foreign equivalents. For example, local infrastructure assets may provide a better match than global infrastructure assets to nominal wage growth in New Zealand. However, expanding our New Zealand investment role requires sufficient availability of opportunities in all asset classes, and our potential to divest when needed.
As New Zealanders, of course we desire outcomes such as increased investment for New Zealand infrastructure, closing any shortfalls in local firms' capital requirements, and widening and deepening our capital markets. These are also natural outcomes of our commercial investment activities in New Zealand.
The Fund has a set of investment assets selected to weather the long-term and grow. Our challenge is to manage through the ups and downs. These are testing times which create the opportunities for long-term investors.
To view NZ Herald Opinion Piece and background information, please follow this link:
______
* Adrian Orr is the CEO of the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation.

1 Comments
Mr Orr You are defending
Mr Orr
You are defending the indefensible.
In any trading environment preservation of capital is paramount.
The long term does not count. You and the trustees are incapable of determining an appropriate discount factor to apply to what ever arbitrary number of years you wish to apply such a volatile variable.
I would consider the igonminy of early retirement is a more appropriate response to the disastrous returns recorded by the NZ Superannuation Fund.
Moreover, the trustees, in my opinion were not attending to their duties in an approriate manner in allowing the losses to spiral to such a degree.
I worked in a multibillion dollar trading environment for twenty years and a tap on the shoulder was always expected for losses beyond a few million.
The Cullen Fund aka Spuer
The Cullen Fund aka Spuer Fund should never have been created in the first place. Allowing taxpayers money to be guided into the investment arena is a complete breach of Parlaimentary privilege.
That it has lost money is not the issue here.
It's simply the wrong way to deal with the issue of pension provision.
Stop investing in it right now.
If you would like to know how to provide a non-risk pension then i would be happy to talk to you about it.
A rather sorry attempt to
A rather sorry attempt to apologise for failing to reduce equity market exposure at the critical juncture. Buy and hold has never been the most successful investment strategy - it is simply a device used by asset managers to maintain control of people's money and cream off a regular stipend. Give my tax back and let me invest for my own dotage.
It will be interesting to
It will be interesting to see (when we find out later) what percentage of international equity investments will be written off entirely during the next 2-3 years. I shudder to think what that will do to the returns and more importantly to the capital position of the fund in a few years. Of course, everyone will then point back and say, how could we see that such a 1-in-100-years event could happen? Same arguments used by electricity industry or others that live by that "long-term" mantra...
I am rather glad I opted out of the super scheme right at the beginning. After all, it is best not to rely too much (or at all) on the public purse to look after you in your retirement.
Another disaster yet to unfold
Another disaster yet to unfold before the public eye.
Email sent 1st May 2000
Office of Hon Dr Michael Cullen
Minister of Finance
Parliament Buildings
Wellington
Dear Minister
Thank you for responding to my request to furnish me with the analysis
documents substantiating the announced decision to diversify the Government
Superannuation Fund (GSF) investment portfolio beyond Government Stock to
include stock market investments. I acknowledge receipt of the Towers Perrin
group study and the Government Actuary 's trial projections paper based on
the conclusions of the study.
My primary reason for wishing to review this material was to check the
underlying assumptions and plausibility of the stock market return forecasts
that gave you cause to publicly assert that: 'The Government Actuary
estimates that the policy could reduce the amount the Crown pays the Fund in
the form of deferred employer contributions by between $14 million and $44
million a year'.
But as I suspected from the outset the Towers Perrin group merely
extrapolate historical stock market returns over the period from 1980 to
1996 to project future returns: (see Attachment 1, page 1-16 and Section
4.2.11, page 33-34). From my experience and others the consensus among
economists and actuaries involved in this type of analysis is that they can
just plug in an assumption on stock returns that is simply a naive
extrapolation from the past.
Your comments mentioned above alerted me to the possibility that your
advisors had taken this elementary but undefended course of action, to derive
sophisticated present value liability outcomes for the GSF, because of similar
debates taking place in the USA over recent years in respect of their Social
Security Fund.
It is common knowledge that the incumbent Clinton administration wishes to
privatise the Social Security System with a view to diversifying the current
and future surpluses away from US Treasury Bonds into the stock market-
either at a institutional fund manager level or by the private 401K vehicle.
These plans generally assume that stock investments will receive annual
real returns of 7%, the average return on stocks over the past seventy-five
years.
The substance of support for the administration's plans are of the economic
projections of the Social Security Administration Office of the Actuary (OACT)
presented to the Trustees of the Social Security System. In their 1998 Report,
the Trustees of the Social Security System project that over the next seventy-five
years the U.S. economy will grow at an annual rate of 1.4%, less than half the
rate of growth of the past seventy-five years. For stocks to provide returns of 7%
under such conditions, the average price-to-earnings ratio -- already at 30 to 1,
more than twice the historic average -- would have to rise eventually to incredible
levels of over 400 to 1.
l
More recently the OACT technical panel recommended a significant reduction in
the projected rates of return assumed from stock, from a 7.0 percent real annual
rate to a 5.7 percent rate. It also recommended an accounting treatment that
recognises the greater risk associated with stock returns. Unfortunately, the panel
did not attempt to construct a set of projections for stock returns, derived from
projections of its components -- dividends and capital gains -- in the same rigorous
manner that it derived its projections of wage growth from productivity growth. There
is no explanation for the panel's failure to use a systematic approach to projecting
stock returns, particularly since other economists, such as M.I.T. Professor
Peter Diamond and Dean Baker, have shown exactly how such projections can be
made.[see attachments to this email above] Had the panel used such a systematic
approach, it would have projected an even lower return for equities of approximately
3.5- 4.0 percent, or alternatively, a decline of 50 percent in the stock market in the
near future.
There would be little point in placing money in the stock market,
since there is not much difference between this yield and the 3.0 percent
real return projected for government bonds. In fact, the difference in returns is
probably not even large enough to cover the administrative costs in the case
of private accounts.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the latest projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
show that before-tax corporate profits will actually shrink by 3.8 percent in real
terms over the next decade. It predicts that after-tax corporate profits
will shrink by a slightly larger amount, declining 4.8 percent in real terms
from 1999 to 2010. The latest profit projections are somewhat lower than what
had appeared in CBO's last report. CBO is projecting that before-tax profits
will rise by just 26.2 percent, in nominal terms, over the period from 1999
to 2010. It projects that nominal after-tax profits will rise by 24.9
percent. As indicated before, both are projected to decline after adjusting
for inflation.
These profit projections are radically at odds with what the stock market
appears to be assuming. It is virtually impossible to see how stocks will be
able to produce returns that are anywhere close to their historic average if
these profit projections prove accurate. This can be shown with a simple
arithmetic calculation.
The return on stocks is equal to the annual dividend payout plus the capital
gain. Because current price to earnings ratios in the stock market are at
record highs, the dividend payout rates are at record lows. Currently the
dividend payout rate is approximately 1.5 percent of share prices (this
figure includes money used to buy back shares as dividend payouts).
This means that in order to provide the 7.0 percent historic rate of real
return on stocks, real stock prices would have to rise by 5.5 percent
annually (7.0 percent, minus the 1.5 percent dividend payout). Given the
decline in profits assumed by CBO, this would imply that the price to
earnings ratio would rise from approximately 30 to 1 at present to almost 60
to 1 by 2010. Even if the real returns in the market averaged just 6.0
percent over the next decade, the CBO profit projections would still imply a
price to earnings ratio of 52 to 1 in 2010. There are few, if any,
economists or market analysts who view such price to earnings ratios as
plausible. Clearly, investors in the market have a very different view of
the economy than the economists at the Congressional Budget Office
In summary, given the above, I challenge you to defend the assumptions
upon which you have declared significant savings for the tax payer by proposing
that the GSF invests in New Zealand and overseas shares.
If the public is to support and fund a GSF investment reform proposal that relies
on higher projected returns in the stock market both domestically and internationally,
it seems incumbent on the proponents of such plans to produce a detailed description
of their assumptions on stock returns. Specifically, this description would present
the year by year assumptions for the two components of the stock return, dividend
payouts and capital gains, in precisely the same manner that the Government Actuary
presumably lays out its assumptions for the current investment in New Zealand
Government Bonds.
It may be possible to construct a plausible scenario in which stock returns average a
nominal 11.6 percent annually assumed by Towers Perrin group and the Government Actuary.
But such an account has not yet been produced and until it is, this assumption about
rates of return does not deserve to be taken seriously in the GSF investment class debate.
ps - the author of this letter freely admits plagiarising text from Dean Baker's compositions.
Yours faithfully
Stephen L Hulme
"A great deal of intelligence
"A great deal of intelligence can be invested in ignorance when the need for illusion is deep."
"”Saul Bellow, To Jerusalem and Back, 1976
If you want to argue
If you want to argue that investing in equities is wrong for all pension funds then you could have chosen a much bigger target. Like, pretty much all pension funds with a very long time horizon.
I heartily recommend to Adrian
I heartily recommend to Adrian Orr and all fund managers and investors; THIS recent "schadenfreude is sweet" letter from one financial expert to another:
http://www.garynorth.com/public/4674.cfm
Kimble, They are messing with
Kimble,
They are messing with taxpayer funds. It's not a private decision to save for retirement.
But, as Stephen alludes to, it is the belief system that "long term" investing pays off in "the long term" that is seriously undermining the situation. Extrapolation in a dangerous game to play...witness how many newspaper financial "experts" continually exhort people to invest and buy property.....do they have even a remote understanding of what they are talking about?
8% returns a year.......imagine that over 20 or 30 years...........double in 10, double again in 20, double again in 30.......it's almost as crazy as forecasters saying oil demand will rise x% a year without wondering what they may mean for supply in 30 years, a supply that is dwindling.
We've had a period of easy money and good times. Unfortunately it has been a false dawn...the end of booms and busts, the end of inflation...the end of history.
We had 9 years of a supposedly social democratic government. Look at society now.....they spent too much time marveling at how easy it all was....money was washing in.....they didn't listen to the many people who kept alerting them to the fact that there were severe structural problems.
A great opportunity was missed.
The Super Fund is just another example of the hubris. Let's copy the Aussies......their market has halved.....so much for the wall of super cash.........
Time for a basic income..........simple, easy, understandable...no room for fancy stuff......no big salaries.....return the stock market to active investors who understand what they are doing.
Raf The hubris you refer
Raf
The hubris you refer to has it's origins as far back as 1990 to 1995.
This article, entitled 'What (Really) Happened in 1995', succinctly outlines the timeline of the changes the Federal Reserve implemented to bring about our current demise:
http://www.itulip.com/forums/showthread.php?t=292
I can attest to the accuracy of the events and actions chronicled in this article as I was working in this arena at the time in London for a large US bank.
Stephen, Nice article. I remember
Stephen,
Nice article. I remember when the UK cut the RAR in '91 from memory. The important lesson for me is that the growth on broad money is the key issue.
Where do people really think all this wealth has come from? In NZ it's easy to show how Broad Money growth has outstripped inflation by a huge amount.
And what is highly correlated to Broad Money growth? House prices.
And yet NZ economists spend all their time dissecting the CPI.
Sigh.
But we might as well be talking to a brick wall. Nobody in positions of influence/power seems to have a clue. Therein lies the real problem.
Everton are Magic!
Everton are Magic!
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