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Nouriel Roubini argues that in the US at least, rising bond yields partly reflect credit demand and potential future growth

Bonds / opinion
Nouriel Roubini argues that in the US at least, rising bond yields partly reflect credit demand and potential future growth
bond traders

A sharp rise in bond yields across key economies like the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France has raised new concerns about the fiscal and financial risks that lay ahead. A common view is that this bond “rout” could augur severe disruptions to economic growth and pain for US and global stock markets.

But while it is true that yields have risen to levels unseen in almost two decades, the relationship between bond yields, economic growth, and stock markets is more complex than this naive view implies. After all, the recent rise in yields could reflect any number of different and contradictory factors.

Consider some of the obvious ones. First, higher inflation stemming from supply shocks—renewed protectionism and war-driven disruptions to the flow of oil—could push nominal yields higher and be stagflationary: reducing growth, increasing inflation, and pushing down equity prices.

Second, unsustainable fiscal deficits could lead to higher yields if markets expect that central banks will step in to monetise them, thus causing higher inflation. Alternatively, if the deficits aren’t likely to be monetised, the higher yields could be driven by a rise of sovereign-risk premia, which could cause a public-debt crisis or crowd out private-sector spending and growth. In these cases, unsustainable fiscal policy does lead to lower growth, possibly higher inflation, and higher yields that hurt stock markets.

But then there is the third factor: a private-sector investment boom driven by capital expenditures (capex) on AI, which is pushing up nominal yields because it fuels higher demand for credit, rather than foreshadowing higher inflation expectations. In this case, higher bond yields are a signal of stronger future growth, which bodes well for stock prices.

This last factor has been a major driver of bond yields and stock markets for the last few years. Since the launch of ChatGPT in 2022, bond yields have gone higher—from a bottom of 1% in the US during the COVID-19 crisis to current levels around or above 5%—as US equities (and some global ones) chalked up double-digit returns. Even until mid-August, the rise in US bond yields coincided with new all-time highs for the main US stock index, the S&P 500.

This is what one would expect. When growth is strong and risk is on, equities do well and bond yields tend to rise; equally, when the appetite for risk is low and the economy is in recession, equities do poorly and bond yields fall. That is why lower bond yields are usually a sign of economic weakness, which in turn implies weakness for stock markets.

Of course, this positive correlation between bond yields and stock returns can turn negative—with bond yields rising as equity prices fall—when inflationary shocks lead to tighter monetary policy, or when there are serious concerns about fiscal sustainability. That is what happened in 2022, when surging deficits and the post-COVID inflation led to a sharp rise in bond yields and a bear market for US and global equities. And something similar occurred following US President Donald Trump’s April 2, 2025, “Liberation Day” tariff announcement, and again during the oil shock triggered by this year’s war with Iran, as well as with the most recent global bond rout, partly led by another spike in oil prices and fiscal concerns.

Whenever a correction in equities is led by bond yields, long-duration assets like tech stocks (whose dividend streams are further in the future) tend to react more to a rise in long-term bond yields than is the case with shorter-duration assets (like the equities of more mature firms). Hence, during the bond rout of 2022, the S&P 500 fell by about 15%, while the tech-heavy Nasdaq fell more than 20%, with many individual tech and growth stocks falling by more than 30%. And during this month’s bond rout, the sharp rise in global yields hurt tech stocks more than the other broader market indices.

But given the positive outlook for growth in tech-led sectors, the returns to tech firms have been higher than traditional equities for the last five years, despite higher bond yields. One therefore should assume that in high-innovation countries like the US, the recent rise in bond yields is mostly driven by the rise in real yields rather than by an increase in inflation expectations, which remain well anchored slightly above 2%.

Again, a rise in real yields is what one would expect, given tech firms’ and hyperscalers’ massive borrowing to finance data-center construction and other investments. While the US fiscal deficit is high, it has plateaued near 6% of GDP and is likely to fall in the next few years, owing to higher potential growth and some additional tariff revenues.

I am not trying to be Panglossian about the US fiscal outlook, which certainly requires serious austerity and entitlement reforms over the next few years. But I would point out that a US economy with higher potential growth—if new technologies increase potential output growth from 2% to 3% or more—has a better medium-term fiscal outlook than the likes of Japan or the eurozone, which are stuck with a potential growth rate of 1.2% for the eurozone and even lower for Japan.

So, both the secular and recent rise in global bond yields largely reflect structural factors like the end of the post-2008 Great Stagnation, higher potential growth and investment, and higher real yields. These are all positives for US and (some) global equities. Of course, in advanced economies that are stagnating and not innovating as much as the US, concerns about large fiscal deficits, public-debt accumulation, and future central-bank monetisation are justified, as are fears of large negative aggregate supply shocks. Here, too, higher bond yields are exactly what one should expect.


*Nouriel Roubini, Professor Emeritus of Economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026, published here with permission.

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8 Comments

What the heck... Dr Gloom has turned into Dr rose tinted glasses.  I struggle to agree with Roubini's new found positivity about the US' future economic outlook.

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His degree didn't include physics - not even introductory. 

I'd put money on it...

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Can't be worth much putting a fiat issued proxy on it.

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I'm with you, Yvil - many of the claims here simply beggar belief - he relies on official data to try and paint a rosy picture, whilst completely ignoring the reality of decades of structural rot and self-inflicted supply chain limits.

The Innovation Illusion and the Infrastructure Bottleneck

Roubini argues that rising bond yields reflect a surge in real economic potential. He points to massive borrowing by US technology firms for data-centre construction as proof of healthy growth. This view assumes that spending vast amounts of capital automatically creates real-world wealth. In reality, this capital expenditure is heading toward a massive roadblock. 

True technological leadership requires industrial capacity, and the United States has allowed its domestic production to wither. 

While mainstream economists praise American innovation, global data shows a starkly different picture. China now leads in the vast majority of critical technology categories, leaving the US with a shrinking share.

This gap becomes clear when looking at the physical limits of building data centres. The US technology boom relies on an electric grid and a supply chain that cannot handle the pressure. A company looking to build a large data centre faces grid-connection delays of up to five years. 

Furthermore, the US is heavily dependent on imported Chinese electrical equipment. Because the US has engaged in trade conflicts with its primary supplier, it now sits at the back of a very long queue for essential parts. 

A five-year delay, combined with paying double for imported transformers, causes capital costs to balloon by three to four times compared to building a standardized facility in China. 

This is not a sign of higher potential growth. It is a major economic risk - a black swan event where massive amounts of capital are trapped in stalled, overpriced projects that cannot generate real economic output.

Negative Real Yields and the Contrived Data Trap

Roubini’s claim that inflation expectations are well anchored rests entirely on official government statistics. He assumes that current nominal bond yields offer a positive real return to investors. This perspective ignores how official metrics like the Consumer Price Index (CPI) are calculated. 

By using complex adjustments, geometric weighting, and concepts like owner’s equivalent rent, official data systematically understates the true rise in the cost of living. When you strip away these accounting methods and look at alternative measures of inflation, the illusion of positive returns disappears.

If you measure the economy through a framework that rejects these official adjustments, real yields on US Treasuries are deeply negative across the entire yield curve. Instead of providing a safe return, government bonds act as a mechanism that destroys purchasing power, costing investors a massive amount of their real wealth each year. 

Even Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) fail to protect capital because their adjustments are tied to the same understated official index. 

Mainstream analysis views a steepening yield curve as a sign of future growth. In truth, it shows that long-duration bonds are failing to price in the ongoing debasement of the currency. This structural loss of purchasing power drives smart capital away from government paper and into hard, tangible assets like gold.

The Delusion of the Plateauing Deficit

Arguably the most unrealistic part of Roubini’s analysis is the assertion that the US fiscal deficit will plateau near six percent of GDP and fall in the coming years. This claim ignores the reality of fiscal dominance. 

The US economy is trapped in a debt doom loop where the cost of servicing existing debt grows exponentially. As interest payments consume a larger share of the national budget, the government must issue even more debt just to keep up.

This problem is made worse by a disappearing pool of foreign buyers for government bonds. For decades, foreign central banks recycled their trade surpluses into US Treasuries. 

Today, global shifts and geopolitical tensions mean those buyers are stepping away. The idea that future tariff revenues or higher potential growth will naturally shrink the deficit is a fantasy. Without structural changes, the deficit cannot plateau. It will continue to expand, forcing the central bank to print more money to keep the government solvent.

The Fix - Systemic Resolution Through the Three-Pillar Architecture

The glaring flaws in Roubini's argument illustrate why traditional economic models cannot fix a broken system. You cannot solve a crisis of fiscal dominance by tweaking interest rates or relying on debt-fueled corporate spending. Real recovery requires an entirely new economic architecture that replaces the speculative financial casino with real-world production.

First, a small 0.25% financial transaction tax must be implemented to act as a filter. This tax introduces strategic friction that completely destroys the profitability of high-frequency trading and speculative algorithms. At the same time, it leaves long-term capital untouched, forcing money to seek yields in real infrastructure and manufacturing rather than paper derivatives.

Second, the nation must abandon unbacked fiat money and anchor its currency to a diversified basket of hard assets, including gold, energy inputs, and structural metals. This hard asset standard introduces automatic discipline, stopping inflation because the money supply can only grow alongside actual physical assets. It stabilizes prices and makes the national currency a global magnet for genuine wealth looking for a secure store of value.

Finally, the state must reclaim the power of money creation as a public utility by nationalising the central bank. Under the current model, private banks create the money supply through debt, draining wealth out of the economy as unearned rent. 

Moving to a sovereign money system allows the financial benefits of issuing currency to flow directly into the public trust. The government can then fund vital domestic projects, update the power grid, and rebuild industrial capacity without issuing debt or causing inflation. 

By combining these three interlocking pillars and executing a decisive debt conversion protocol, an economy can break free from the debt trap and spark a genuine productive boom within two to five years.

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Great comment Colin !

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Āgreed.

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Problems can arise when believers in US exceptionalism, outperformance and AI 'opportunities' leverage themselves to the hilt, as with Situational Awareness

https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-sec-sends-subpoenas-wall-street-banks-over-situational-awareness-nyt-reports-2026-08-24/

 

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Problems can arise when believers - full stop.

Doesn't matter what in - it it's false, it's a problem. 

Economic growth forever, is one such. Sort of outranks most of the others. 

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