With Russia under pressure on multiple fronts, President Vladimir Putin finds himself in a tighter spot than at any other moment of his quarter-century in power. Putin remains firmly in charge of the Kremlin, but there is a growing risk that he will try to escape his current predicament by escalating his conflict with the West.
Putin’s first problem is that his war in Ukraine has no momentum. Recent territorial gains have come slowly and at the cost of enormous loss of life (some 450,000 killed, almost eight times the US body count in Vietnam) and economic damage. After four years and four months, Russian forces control about 20% of Ukraine’s territory—the same percentage they held three years ago. Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to demonstrate its determination to win, its resilience in the face of Russian missile and drone attacks, and its remarkable capacity for innovation in weapons and battlefield tactics. Its successes have emboldened it to go on offense.
Most notably, Ukraine has successfully brought the war to the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia has occupied for a dozen years. Crimea is a crucial arena for both strategic and symbolic reasons. It was there, in 2014, that Russia began its war on Ukraine.
Putin has treated the territory as the crown jewel of his “New Russia” and invested heavily in its development, both to connect it to the Russian mainland and to make it an attractive place for Russians to live and visit. Crimea is also strategically vital for Ukraine’s continued access to the Black Sea, an economic lifeline.
In recent weeks, Ukraine has sent swarms of drones to attack military sites, power plants, and railway stations on the peninsula. It has struck Crimea-bound Russian trucks traveling through occupied eastern Ukraine and across the expensive Kerch bridge that Putin built after illegally annexing the peninsula. And it has hit Russian cargo ferries resupplying the region by water. As a result, Crimea’s residents face shortages (particularly of gasoline to fuel their cars) and frequent power outages.
But Putin’s greatest frustration is Ukraine’s success in striking deep inside Russia itself. It was embarrassing enough that fears of a Ukrainian attack kept Russia from rolling its arsenal through Red Square during this year’s Victory Day parade, which is supposed to be a celebration of Russia’s greatest military achievements.
But even more humiliating was Ukraine’s use of missiles and drones to attack energy facilities and other sites in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as additional targets hundreds of miles from the war’s frontlines. Ukraine has shattered the illusion for many Russians that the war could never arrive on their doorstep.
Ukraine’s successes have become so obvious that, on June 28, Putin was forced to acknowledge them on Russian state television. He admitted that the recent strikes, which he referred to only as “terrorist attacks on our territory,” have created shortages that force the government to import more fuel as repairs are made. He is publicly signaling that he knows Russians face hardships, which are compounded by internet disruptions stemming from the Kremlin’s attempt to force the public onto state-controlled sites.
Russia’s broader economy, now heavily focused on supporting the war effort, faces headwinds, too. The central bank has warned that growth in 2026 could fall to as low as 0.5%.
Yet Putin still hopes Russia can win a war of attrition. In recent days, state media has made much of military advances on the city of Kostyantynivka, which might serve as a gateway to broader territorial gains in eastern Ukraine. Putin is still betting that US President Donald Trump will actively undermine the resupply of Ukraine’s military and further disrupt NATO, and perhaps hoping that elections next year in France, Britain, Italy, and some key German states could upend European support for Ukraine as well.
But Russia’s battlefield performance over the past several years suggests that any further gains will continue to come slowly and at a high human and economic cost. Russian casualties (killed and disabled) now outnumber new recruits. And Trump seems to have lost interest in helping Russia, particularly as successful Ukrainian strikes have changed the war.
Moreover, Europeans have become more serious about longer-term investments in their own defense. Although big elections loom across the continent, they remain many months away, and populist victories that reduce support for Ukraine are no sure thing.
Despite the setbacks and embarrassments, there is scant evidence that Putin is in trouble at home. Some Russian media have hinted at growing public frustration with the war, but there remains no alternative to Putin’s leadership, and he still appears uninterested in peace talks.
Thus, Europeans and Russia’s nearest neighbors worry about what Putin might do were he genuinely backed into a corner. We are sure to see a continued expansion of Russian missile strikes at Ukrainian cities—like the major July 2 drone and missile attack that killed at least 27 people in Kyiv. We can also expect more military provocations involving NATO countries, particularly with drones that Europeans remain unprepared to handle. Last year’s arson attacks against property linked to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and last month’s episode in which a Russian warship fired warning shots at a British yacht in the English Channel, offer hints of what may be coming.
If Ukraine can continue to disrupt Crimea, strike more targets in the heart of Russia, frustrate Russia’s frontline forces, and pile more pressure on Russia’s hobbled economy, an isolated, aging, and frustrated Putin may decide he needs a game-changing attack.
The use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, a direct frontal assault on the former Soviet republics of Latvia and Estonia (now NATO members), and major cyberattacks on European or American targets remain extremely unlikely for now. But aggressive provocations against NATO countries, even if they fall short of clear acts of war, can still create serious security, economic, and political risks. And if Putin concludes that his political or physical survival are in danger, his willingness to gamble will grow quickly.
Ian Bremmer, Founder and President of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, is a member of the Executive Committee of the UN High-level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026, and published here with permission.
10 Comments
IMO Putin must by now be seen as almost impotent by the Russian public given that they are being financially squeezed daily and the war is no longer remote due to undeniably effective attacks by Ukraine on oil and electricity infrastructure including in Moscow and St Petersburg. Though he could instigate attacks on smaller NATO countries to try and reframe that impotency as strength it's not going to slow down Ukraines increasingly more effective strikes. Nuclear strikes by Russia on say Kyiv imo is an unlikely option because it will not make Ukraine surrender and the response of its allies is likely to wipe out the FSB and Kremlin hierarchy so FSB will in self preservation want to kill Putin to prevent their own demise.
Nigel. While polling (for what it's worth in autocratic Russia) does indicate growing public concern about the stalemated invasion of Ukraine, any prediction about public perception of Putin and his eventual fate must be informed by the centuries of psychological conditioning of the Russian people. He is regarded as the archetypal Russian strongman who rebuilt Russian prestige after its collapse following the end of the Cold War. No matter how much they suffer and are lied to about what is really happening in Ukraine, they will continue to support him. Look at the monster Stalin who slaughtered tens of millions of Russians and yet was worshipped by the people because he was perceived as having lifted Russia to world power status. It's unlikely there will be a mass public move against him, any coup will need to come from within the palace.
Not so sure you can apply a western view of governance to Russia? Putin is the equivalent of royalty in Russia. He is above the dysfunction of the state. It's his subordinates that are seen as the cause of any ills in society through incompetence, corruption etc. Putin is seen as the solution not the cause. You will not see him engaging in day to day issues, only making grand broad statements on general policy. He's above the hum drum of day to day issues. It's not him that will be fed to the dogs upon failure.
Could there be a coup? Who by? There's been a systematic purge of any possible challengers over Putin's 26 year rein. It's a common refrain among the proletariat, "if not Putin, then who?" An analogy could be the Maga view of Trump. A substantial minority back him as he robs them blind. TBH I get the impression Putin is Trump's template for adopting autocracy.
Putin is all in. Economic collapse is really the only possible circuit breaker. Putin has many external lifelines unfortunately, including from the US.
Yep, we think alike re Putins perceived omnipotence and that a population wide movement against him is unlikely. Perhaps with the caveat that if he is forced to begin recruiting from the urban population to maintain the Ukrainian meat grinder, the elite could become restive. On the palace court, yes he has in true tyrant style eliminated potential challengers and surrounded himself with sycophants, with the incompetent military Chief of Staff Gerasimov a notable example. But interestingly an increasing number of propagandists have recently adopted a less obsequious stance on the war, with a few even daring to suggest it is not going as well as hoped and that Russia may be forced to make concessions to the Europe and Nato incited Ukrainian aggressor. A few small cracks appearing.
Centuries of totalitarian rule, a subjugated population and well entrenched national suspicion of anything foreign, all providing Putin, with his well established security and censor apparatus, advantage and power. Still to the East lies a population about ten times the size and a nation that once counted the intermediary territory, in its empire. History does not much form of one weak totalitarian power surviving that well against a totalitarian neighbour far bigger, stronger, better armed and economically superior. In invading Ukraine, Russia has not only supplemented that disparity but also its dependency on the same.
FG. Yes, the role reversal in our times between Russia and China is fascinating. As large state land bordered countries tend to do, Stalin strove to keep all its neighbours weak. He invaded Manchuria at the wars end, stripping most of its industrial infrastructure and played hardball over Mongolia. He attempted to persuade Mao to leave Southern china in Kuomintang hands and thus the country split. Mao would have none of it of course but while he was a brilliant military leader, he was an appalling peacetime one. Stalins wishes for a debilitated country were fulfilled. But how the tables have turned with Putin today the junior partner and little prospect of that changing ahead.
Indeed! And when you consider, in each nation’s long, long and storied history, the Russian regime is barely over a century in power and that of China not even there yet. The present, short lived and not always affable, relationship adds up comparatively, to not much more than of blip status.
For what it is worth, I have family with a Russian friend who goes back and visits each year. They have advised prices aren't crazy like the media seems to want everyone to think, the war isn't a dominant topic of conversation for most, only if it directly impacts those around them, and there is still plenty of imported goods coming in via non-sanctioned countries as said goods just get exported to non-sanctioned countries then forwarded to Russia. My wife and I were given some Russian chocolate form them, and it was delicious to be honest. Just one anecdotal note, but from someone who goes there at least it sounded vastly different from what we get shown.
Int1234. Indeed interesting, thanks. I think it reflects life for most inhabitants of Russias larger metropolises, the latest shortages of fuel aside. Life in the provinces is I suggest rather different, where only about half the population is connected to running water and sewerage systems. One doesn't have to travel far in Russia to observe its two tier economic structure. That most recruits for Putins invasion are from these economically deprived provinces is unsurprising.
War a dominant topic? Well no. That's because Russians expressing an opinion differing from official Kremlin doctrine are fined for minor "offending" and imprisoned for more serious or repeat "offending". The population have been depoliticised by state security with clubs, torture, and at the point of a gun.
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