Chinese rulers already recognized the importance of accurate population data more than 3,000 years ago. Under the Western Zhou dynasty, officials presented the king with the figures in an annual ritual honoring the star believed to govern population counts.
During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, Guan Zhong, chancellor of Qi, compared governing without reliable population numbers to crossing a river without a boat or an oar. Qin’s chief minister, Shang Yang, warned that without this information, even a powerful state could be torn apart.
The Qin Empire, whose rise and unification of China in 221 BCE were underpinned by reliable data, punished falsifiers of population figures as harshly as defectors. When the dynasty fell, Xiao He, Liu Bang’s adviser, seized Qin’s population and other state records, helping Liu defeat his rivals and establish the Han dynasty.
Centuries later, the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty showed how losing reliable population data could bring down an empire. Having lost track of its population and farmland, much of which fell under elite control, the central government lost tax revenue, soldiers, and corvée labor. The state could not even fund Yellow River works, leading hungry and unpaid river workers to join a rebellion. After just 98 years, the dynasty collapsed.
Soviet leaders, by contrast, manipulated population figures for political gain. Joseph Stalin’s agricultural-collectivization campaign, launched in 1929, caused a famine that killed millions of people, yet these deaths were absent from official statistics.
Stalin also claimed the USSR’s population had reached 168 million in 1933 and expected the 1937 census to show a growing, contented population of 180 million. When it counted just 162 million, Stalin regarded the results as a political disaster. Later, the head of the Census Bureau, Olimpiy Kvitkin, and three senior colleagues were arrested and accused by Pravda of seeking to “diminish the numbers of the population of the USSR.” Kvitkin was executed by firing squad, and the census itself was suppressed and branded “harmful.” A new census in 1939 used more politically acceptable methods and reported a population of 170.5 million, but discrepancies prevented publication of the full report.
Russia’s fertility rate fell below replacement level as early as the 1960s. But, as demographer Anatoly Vishnevsky put it, officials concealed the problem through elaborate “games.” By the 1980s, low fertility was shrinking the country’s working-age population. Oblivious to this, Soviet leaders invested heavily in foreign ventures like the war in Afghanistan.
The People’s Republic of China, having based its system on the Soviet model, adopted the practice of manipulating statistics. During the Great Leap Forward, local officials were all too happy to inflate grain-yield figures to meet Mao Zedong’s objective of “surpassing Britain and catching up with America.” Qian Xuesen, the “father of Chinese rocketry,” gave these claims a veneer of scientific legitimacy. The inflated harvest figures helped keep the campaign going for three years, contributing to tens of millions of starvation deaths.
Manipulated statistics also shaped China’s population policy. In 1979, Chinese leaders floated the idea of a one-child policy but lacked scientific backing for it. Rocket scientist Song Jian, a protégé of Qian, filled the gap with seemingly rigorous projections that China’s population, unrestricted, could skyrocket to 4.3 billion by 2080. The one-child policy was formally adopted several months later, in September 1980.
Around 1991, China’s fertility rate had fallen below replacement level, yet fertility and birth statistics were revised upward to sustain the government’s claims of overpopulation. The 2000 census counted just 13.8 million infants, while official birth figures for that year stood at 17.7 million. In a 2002 paper, a senior family-planning official argued that if the census was accurate, China would no longer need its family-planning policy. As late as 2014, Zhai Zhenwu, then-president of the China Population Association, warned of an intolerable baby boom, projecting that a two-child policy would push the fertility rate to 4.5 births per woman and annual births to nearly 50 million.
The longer the government relied on bogus population figures, the more difficult it became to admit that it had been manipulating them. To do so would have dealt a massive blow to the government’s credibility. It would have meant acknowledging that the one-child policy was a colossal error and revealing that foreign investors and governments had based their China strategies on false data.
In a recent monograph in Contemporary China Review, I present extensive evidence that China’s official population figures are overstated by at least 130 million, with the largest discrepancies concentrated among people born after 1990. For years, these inflated population figures drove projections that China’s economy would far surpass America’s and strengthened Chinese leaders’ belief that the balance of power was shifting in their favor. As early as 2011, an internal report urged the Communist Party’s leadership to abandon Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “hiding its capabilities and biding its time.”
Party doctrine reflected this growing confidence. In 2012, then-President Hu Jintao articulated his “Three Confidences” in China’s path, theory, and system. China had already begun moving away from Deng’s strategy of integration with the West, adopting a more assertive foreign policy. President Xi Jinping completed the “Four Confidences” in 2016, adding culture to Hu’s original three. Soon enough, officials began invoking the slogan “the East is rising and the West is declining.”
In the United States, rosy assessments of China’s economic strength have long fueled misguided “Thucydides trap” narratives and heightened strategic anxiety. But policymakers in both countries have failed to recognize China’s demographic Achilles’ heel, even as its shrinking workforce has been sapping its economic momentum.
*Yi Fuxian, a senior scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, spearheaded the movement against China’s one-child policy. His book Big Country with an Empty Nest (China Development Press, 2013), initially banned, now ranks first in China Publishing Today’s 100 Best Books of 2013 in China. Copyright 2026 Project Syndicate, here with permission.
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