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Dave McLeish offers three suggestions to address moral hazard risk he sees in the Depositor Compensation Scheme

Public Policy / opinion
Dave McLeish offers three suggestions to address moral hazard risk he sees in the Depositor Compensation Scheme

By Dave McLeish*

Tuesday's Financial Stability Report from the Reserve Bank has a few numbers tucked away on the very last page that deserve more attention than their placement suggests.

Finance company deposits grew 28% in the year to June. Compared with credit union and building society deposits, which rose 2.5%, and bank deposits, which grew about 4%, that's rapid growth, admittedly from a low base.

The Reserve Bank attributes much of that growth to deposits flowing in since the Depositor Compensation Scheme (DCS) was introduced.

That's because, if a licensed deposit taker fails, the scheme will pay back each depositor up to $100,000. That money comes first from a fund built up through levies. But the fund only started filling last year and is expected to take around 20 years to reach its target. Until then, the Crown, and therefore our taxpayer dollars, is the back-up lender.

Private profits, public risk

Protecting everyday savers is a good thing. But what's not often discussed is how significantly the DCS may be changing the funding economics for some of the scheme's higher-risk deposit takers. Who are now enjoying much cheaper, and increasingly abundant, funding because the public ultimately stands behind their depositors.

Finance companies play an important role in New Zealand's financial system. They provide funding to businesses and borrowers who may not fit the lending criteria of traditional banks, and many are well-run businesses. But they operate in a different part of the risk spectrum, and that's precisely why the DCS needs to get its pricing right.

Their lending often includes property development, bridging finance and borrowers with more complicated circumstances. These are legitimate markets, but they can involve more concentrated loan books, greater credit risk and thinner capital buffers relative to the risks being taken. Their resilience can also be tested much more severely when the economy turns.

It's also why they earn more. Finance companies' net interest margins are still above 3%, while our big banks, which already enjoy some of the highest margins in the developed world, sit in the low-to-mid 2s.

That's not inherently unreasonable. Higher-risk lending should offer higher potential returns. But it also reinforces why we need to be appropriately compensated for the risks we’re underwriting.

What's in it for us?

The levies are risk-based, at least on paper. A major bank in the lowest-risk category (RC1) pays about $37.10 a year for every $100,000 of insured deposits. A finance company in the highest-risk category (RC4) pays $63.20. So, about 70% more.

But compare that with what the wholesale market charges for different levels of credit risk, and you might question whether the difference in DCS levies goes far enough.

Take an AA- rated New Zealand bank. It pays around 0.5% more than the New Zealand Government to borrow in the wholesale bond market for five years. For context, lower-rated financial institutions in overseas wholesale markets can pay around 7% over government bonds for the same term.

That's a striking example of how differently the market prices credit risk. Which shows, the spread demanded of a B- rated financial institution can be around fourteen times that demanded of an AA- rated bank.

I'm not suggesting DCS levies should mirror wholesale credit spreads. They're different things, with different purposes. But the comparison does raise a legitimate question: are we charging enough for the very different risks we're agreeing to insure?

The moral hazard involved

More deposits mean more money that finance companies need to lend out. But what happens when the money arrives faster than good lending opportunities?

The potential pressure is to expand into new markets, compete more aggressively for borrowers or accept risks that might otherwise have been uneconomic.

That's not an allegation about what individual institutions are doing. It's an incentive the scheme needs to recognise and guard against.

The Reserve Bank itself flagged this risk in its May report, noting that finance companies could be tempted to loosen lending standards to grow.

This is the policy paradox. A scheme designed to protect depositors can, if it isn't priced and monitored properly, inadvertently encourage the very risk-taking it is intended to protect against.

We’ve been here before

During the global financial crisis, the Crown guaranteed retail deposits to hold confidence together. And, rather unsurprisingly, the Auditor-General later found that some finance companies saw huge increases in their deposits in response.

That didn't stop nine of the 30 covered by the guarantee from failing, leaving taxpayers on the hook for around $2 billion.

Today's scheme is different. But the lesson stands. When intervention distorts the normal relationship between risk and return, it changes the behaviour of the institutions that benefit.

That's not an argument against protecting depositors. It's an argument for making sure the protection doesn't create unintended consequences.

What should we be getting?

The DCS isn't bad policy. But it shouldn't become a quiet subsidy for private company balance sheets either. Three things would help.

Price it properly. Levies should reflect each institution's real risk. The Reserve Bank already requires most of these institutions to hold a credit rating. So why not make greater use of it?

Consider growth limits. Rapid balance-sheet growth, particularly when accompanied by declining capital buffers, like we’re currently seeing should trigger closer regulatory scrutiny and, where appropriate, limits on further lending growth until the institution's capital and risk management catch up.

Show us the numbers. We, the public, should be able to see how much risk we're on the hook for and how that risk is measured, so we can judge whether the levies match the potential cost.

Protecting everyday savers is absolutely the right objective. But a scheme funded, ultimately, by the public needs to get the balance right. It should protect depositors without inadvertently subsidising risk-taking or giving some institutions a funding advantage at the expense of taxpayers.


*Dave McLeish is the Managing Director at Wedge, a New Zealand-owned fund manager specialising in savings products. Wedge operates in the same broad market as the institutions discussed in this article.

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