sign up log in
Want to go ad-free? Find out how, here.

Auditor General says Treasury lacked financial prudence in administering Crown retail deposit guarantee scheme; Let taxpayer risk grow

Auditor General says Treasury lacked financial prudence in administering Crown retail deposit guarantee scheme; Let taxpayer risk grow

"Financial prudence" should have been a significant consideration for Treasury in its oversight of the Crown retail deposit guarantee scheme and Treasury should have been more willing to intervene to prevent finance companies significantly increasing their taxpayer guaranteed deposits once they had the guarantee in place rather than merely looking to recover what it could after a company fell over, the Auditor General says in an audit report on the implementation and management of the scheme.

Controller and Auditor-General Lyn Provost says Treasury was in a reactive mode for too long, responding to needs as they emerged rather than systematically anticipating and preparing for the next eventuality as it oversaw a scheme guaranteeing up to NZ$133 billion of investor funds. 

Provost notes that from the outset, the advice from officials was that the decision to include finance companies in the scheme carried significant risk. Ultimately nine finance companies with deposits covered by the scheme, which ran from October 2008 until October 2010 failed including South Canterbury Finance, causing the Crown to pay out about NZ$2 billion of taxpayers' money to depositors. As Provost notes, It'll be some time before the various receiverships are completed and the total amount recovered from the finance companies is known. But expected recoveries are currently estimated at about NZ$900 million of that NZ$2 billion leaving the taxpayer with a NZ$1.1 billion loss.

"Once deposits with these (finance) companies were guaranteed, depositors could safely move investments to where they would get the highest return, irrespective of the risk of company failure," Provost says. "The finance companies also had less reason to minimise risk in their investment activity. The Crown was carrying much of this risk."

"During 2009, the Treasury watched some of that behaviour eventuate. Deposits with finance companies under the Scheme grew, in some instances significantly. We saw one example where a finance company’s deposits grew from NZ$800,000 to NZ$8.3 million after its deposits were guaranteed. At South Canterbury Finance Limited, the deposits grew by 25% after the guarantee was put in place."

South Canterbury Finance was able to offer 8% interest rates to investors whilst carrying the guarantee as it desperately attempted to attract much needed longer-term funding, in a move that rivals argued allowed it to distort the investment market.

'Treasury didn't see itself as able to interact with a finance company to try to moderate its behaviour'

She says from mid-2009, Treasury was closely monitoring these changes and the individual companies that were identified as being at risk.

"However, it was largely doing so to prepare for potential payouts. It did not see itself as able to interact with a finance company to attempt to moderate that behaviour, even when it could see the Crown’s potential liability increasing markedly. The view appeared to be that it was better to recover what funds it could after an institution failed, than try to influence events before a failure," Provost says.

"In essence, the Treasury remained in a reactive mode for too long, responding to needs as they emerged, rather than systematically anticipating and preparing for the next eventuality."

'Financial prudence should have been a consideration'

Treasury's approach relied too heavily on a presumption of minimal intervention and gave insufficient weight to the need to manage the overall potential cost to the taxpayer, she says.

"Although the Scheme’s primary objective was to secure depositor and public confidence, and it was accepted that this would involve a significant cost, financial prudence should still have been a significant consideration," Provost adds.

She saw no evidence of the growing financial risks being considered at a strategic level or informing the Treasury’s ongoing policy analysis and advice to Ministers on options.

"Although there were ongoing discussions with Ministers about policy settings, we did not see evidence of strategic analysis of the range of options alongside the unfolding risks. In particular, we consider the evidence of increasing deposits and liability should have prompted more policy work."

Furthermore, the same approach was seen in how individual applications were considered.

"In our view, further enquiries could have been made of some financial institutions as part of the application process. The Treasury and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did not seek additional information in the early days of the scheme, because they were squarely focused on the objective of depositor confidence. At that time, managing the size of the Crown’s potential liability was not the primary concern," Provost says.

"Although we cannot say definitively that more immediate close monitoring would have reduced the overall cost to the Crown, closer monitoring could have helped identify risks for earlier consideration and possible management."

Unforeseen problems

Meanwhile, other problems weren't foreseen at the beginning, such as that the Crown would be liable for interest that continued to accrue on deposits after a finance company failed but before payouts were made. She acknowledges that problems were to be expected with a scheme put together in such haste.

"In my view, the Treasury should have recognised this from the outset, and established an ongoing work stream for identifying problems and providing advice on options for addressing them. This work did not begin until 2009. However, the Treasury did then take steps to improve the effectiveness of the scheme. It was later modified twice in ways that addressed many of the problems."

Although Treasury repeatedly responded well to the immediate operational needs, it didn't appreciate how important it is to “get ahead of the wave” as quickly as possible, to maintain a clear and comprehensive view of the strategic picture and start planing and managing accordingly. She says Treasury officials say they've learned from the experience, and now take a more structured approach to crisis situations.

"Overall, the Scheme achieved its goal. No banks in New Zealand failed, and there was no run on banks. Many of the other finance institutions also survived the global financial crisis. The economy was stabilised," Provost says.

"However, there have been costs. Nine finance companies in the scheme failed, causing the Crown to pay out about NZ$2 billion to depositors."

A lack of overall governance meant there was no coherent strategic overview to inform the evolving thinking and work on individual tasks. This affected the practical work needed for the successful operation of the scheme, the approach taken to managing the scheme’s major risks, and how and when the hastily put-together scheme was reviewed and refined over time.

Treasury rejects suggestion it should've intervened more

Treasury Secretary Gabriel Makhlouf rejects Provost's view that more intervention in finance companies might've reduced the fiscal risks of the scheme.

“The guarantee scheme was already a very significant, but necessary, intervention in New Zealand’s financial system," Makhlouf says. "The Treasury considered a range of further interventions but couldn’t find a case where intervention was more likely to create a better outcome. All interventions carry a degree of risk and we don’t believe that the Auditor General’s report gives sufficient weight to the risks that further interventions would have created,” Makhlouf says.

“I’m pleased to have this independent external view of how the Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme worked and pleased that the report finds that the Treasury generally ran the scheme well. The report will be a key resource in ensuring that we learn as much as possible from that experience,” Makhlouf adds.

(Update replaces earlier BusinesDesk story).

We welcome your comments below. If you are not already registered, please register to comment.

Remember we welcome robust, respectful and insightful debate. We don't welcome abusive or defamatory comments and will de-register those repeatedly making such comments. Our current comment policy is here.


@ Makhlouf

Move along - nothing to see here

How much longer can this deficit of accountability for our servant's glaring errors be financed by incredulous taxpaying masters?


Stephen, Makhlouf is there as a propagandist. Remember he comes from a role advising Gordon Brown. In this case it is Bill English who was ultimately responsible for TSY's performance, and now being shielded by Makhlouf.

Of course the political decisions behind all aspects of the guaranteeing of finance companies remain off limits to investigation.


Yes, exactly right. No one should forget Makhlouf's previous incarnation - a close confidant to the most excremental of UK Chancellors.

I thought his appointment was a hideous mistake and I see only confirmation in his comments above.


Makhlouf ws always a bad idea. His PR puff piece at the conclusion of the article highlights just how bad an idea it was to hire him.  National will continue to Blame Labour for putting the scheme in place. Some how not understanding that when they became government they should have seen what was happening and done something about it. Even Cullen would have done something, but not the Nats, Not the 'down grade' party


@Bill English - Stuff

"I think there's a bit of rewriting of history going on here," he told Radio New Zealand.

The guarantee had been urgently set up over a weekend and no one in New Zealand at the time knew how to run such a scheme. Treasury's initial priority was getting companies into the scheme.

"Treasury could have, in an ideal world, had the people and the strategy in place on day one.

"Treasury did not have the powers to direct companies over whether they were taking deposits or not."

South Canterbury Finance was regarded as a viable successful institution at the time it was accepted into the scheme, he said.  

Is it not the case that in an enviroment of increasing public concern the guarantee was extended by a National government led Treasury to include South Canterbury Finance?


Yes, Bill English is attempting to mislead us again. Some good advice to Bill from Katherine Mansfield:

Risk! Risk anything!

Care no more for the opinion of others.

Do the hardest thing on earth for you.

Act for yourself.

Face the truth.


It is interesting to see how the government rewarded finance companies and their investors who took to many risks. This is a classic 'moral hazard' result. Not only were the risky investors protected, but with the guarantees in place, had every reason to carry on even more risky behaviour! As usual, the government intervention achieved the reverse of what it wanted.

The more prudent finance companies received nothing for their efforts. In addition there was no learning process for NZ investors, who should have got their fingers burnt. We should be learning from our investment mistakes, but with our current leaders, that is unlikely to happen.

It reminds me of the days when the most successful businessmen were those who correctly guessed what Muldoon was going to do next.


Treasury's approach relied too heavily on a presumption of minimal intervention  

This epitomises my experience as a CG manager.  It always amazed me how much money we paid these policy people to devote so much effort to legitimising the "do nothing" approach.

Having entered CG from a private sector career - I was dumbfounded.

Oh the stories I could tell...... :-)



Interesting press release here on Treasury's use of consultants from the Greens. Here's the full list of 200 that cost us nearly $14 mln -…

Greens question Treasury spend-up on consultants

Over the last two-and-a-half years, Treasury has employed the services of 200 consultants costing taxpayers $13.8 million, Green Party Co-leader Russel Norman revealed today.

“Treasury has spent an average of $6.6 million a year on external consultants in the first two years of the National Government. This is more than double the average annual spend under the previous Labour Government,” said Dr Norman.

The figures were uncovered through a series of parliamentary questions lodged by Dr Norman.

“Despite the Government’s rhetoric about searching for efficiency gains in the public sector, Treasury has spent up big on consultants,” said Dr Norman.

“The one government department telling all others to tighten their belts has seen its budget grow by 25 percent since 2008, in large part driven by the large growth in the use of external consultants.

Approximately one-third of the expenditure on external consultants has been attributed to work on the Crown Deposit Guarantee Scheme.

“Given the Auditor-General’s recent findings that Treasury dropped the ball on the management of the Crown Deposit Guarantee Scheme – a $133 billion potential taxpayer liability – it’s timely to question Treasury’s use of external consultants,” said Dr Norman.

“Would the money have been better spent employing staff internally to manage the Scheme?

“Greater resources within Treasury should have focused on limiting the Crown’s exposure to risk under the Deposit Guarantee rather than on the Government’s priority of preparing state-owned assets for fire-sale.”

Dr Norman said further investigation of Treasury’s use of consultants was needed to determine whether Treasury was lacking essential internal capacity, or if there was a developing culture of excessive reliance on expensive outside consultants.