Gemma Cheng'er Deng and Jim O'Neill think the United States and its traditional allies lack a coherent strategy for gealing with emerging powers

By Gemma Cheng'er Deng and Jim O'Neill*

The release of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy marks a pivotal moment for the United States and the West. The US has recast its global role around a narrower set of core priorities, emphasising industrial revitalisation, resilient supply chains, and strategic competition, while also signaling that traditional allies must shoulder greater responsibility for their own security and economic fortunes.

At the same time, the European Union is advancing industrial policy proposals – such as a requirement that critical goods contain up to 70% EU-sourced content – that reflect deep anxiety over dependency, vulnerability, and a loss of control. But a more fundamental rethink is needed, both across Europe and in the United Kingdom.

The age of Western strategic dominance has passed. Supply chains that were once treated as neutral commercial assets are now instruments of power, and decisions about technology, trade, and investment have become inseparable from questions of national security, social stability, and the cost of living. Yet too often, Western policies oscillate between moral posturing and defensive intervention, rather than advancing a coherent long-term strategy.

The immediate post-Cold War worldview treated the West’s economic dominance as a sign that all countries would converge on its liberal model. That proved incorrect. What we are facing today is not a passing disruption, but a structural transformation: a shift from a largely unipolar system to a more fragmented, contested, and multipolar set of arrangements. In this environment, the central question for the West is not how to restore a fading order, but how to operate credibly and responsibly in one where influence must be shared.

This challenge is perfectly illustrated by the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which recently added Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran. Though often dismissed as a merely symbolic counterweight to the G7, the BRICS+ grouping reflects a deeper material reality. Its members account for a growing share of the global population, economic output, production, and natural resources.

Moreover, the two largest members, China and India, are anything but peripheral participants in the international system. They sit at the heart of the changing world economy, with its evolving supply chains, technology ecosystems, and sources of energy. China’s dominance in rare-earth processing and leadership in renewables underscore the limits of any Western strategy premised on exclusion. So far, Western responses to China’s growth remain largely reactive, with “de-risking” serving as the organising principle. But while the impulse is understandable, risk management is not a grand strategy.

A more effective approach would start with an honest reassessment of interests. For Britain, the EU, and the US alike, this means moving beyond abstract debates (many framed as “values versus pragmatism”) to confront the real trade-offs that shape policymaking. Concerns about dependence and security must be balanced against worries about affordability, the sustainability of de-risking measures, and domestic social cohesion.

European companies often navigate these tensions pragmatically, sourcing technology from wherever it is most competitive. For example, to remain viable, Deutsche Bahn, Germany’s state-owned rail operator, has sourced a small share (around 5%) of its new electric-vehicle fleet from the Chinese manufacturer BYD. But even this decision sparked criticism from trade unions.

These tensions cannot be wished away, only managed. Western countries need disciplined prioritisation, not doctrinal purity. Core principles such as the rule of law, national sovereignty, and human rights should still set clear limits on engagement, but they cannot substitute for strategy. Cooperation with states operating under different political systems is unavoidable in areas ranging from climate change and technology standards to finance and global development. Pretending otherwise only narrows the West’s room for maneuver.

Moral signaling without a credible plan to reconcile values with material dependence ultimately undermines both credibility abroad and consent at home. The task ahead is neither containment nor decoupling, but selective engagement guided by clearly defined interests. Security concerns require limits and safeguards, but they do not justify disengagement. In a multipolar system, influence is exercised not only through restriction, but through participation, agenda-setting, and the ability to shape rules where interests overlap.

As new forms of multilateralism emerge, the West must invest far more in understanding emerging powers’ political economies and strategic motivations. This requires moving beyond fear-driven narratives and building up more analytical capacity and policy-relevant expertise. If Western governments continue to respond piecemeal – reacting to each shock as it arrives – they will lose the ability to shape outcomes and global trends.

The multipolar age demands a shift in mentality. The choice for the West is not whether to share power, but whether to shape how that sharing occurs. The alternative is a reactive posture that raises costs at home and steadily erodes influence abroad.

Gemma Cheng’er Deng is a doctoral researcher at King’s College London and co-author (with Kerry Brown) of China Through European Eyes: 800 Years Of Cultural And Intellectual Encounter (World Scientific Publishing Europe, 2022). Jim O’Neill is a former UK Treasury minister and a former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026. www.project-syndicate.org