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Keith Woodford warns there are no easy answers for funding superannuation. Those who think there are do not recognise the realities

Public Policy / opinion
Keith Woodford warns there are no easy answers for funding superannuation. Those who think there are do not recognise the realities
superannuation options

There is a widespread belief that superannuation in coming decades is going to be a major problem for New Zealand. 

I have spent many hours in recent weeks exploring whether this is true. Alas, it is likely to be true.

The first reality is that nothing much can be achieved without a strong level of consensus across the political spectrum. I came to a rapid conclusion that the current debate is not well informed.

Out of personal interest, I then analysed strategies that could be applied to manage the problem, including doing my own computer-based modelling.

As background to what I write here, in recent months I have written an article on the need to work towards a stable population if we wish to maintain living standards within our constrained natural resources. I have written another article on the challenges of doing this.

This article draws on the findings presented in those two previous articles, to here focus specifically on superannuation.

The biggest message from those articles is that immigration is a big part of the long-term superannuation problem that we face. It is not the solution. This will seem surprising to many people but it needs to be recognised and understood.

My starting point here is to remind readers of some facts and hopefully dispel some myths. 

Currently, there are close to one million superannuitants in New Zealand. Everyone over the age of 65 is eligible as long as they meet residency requirements, including five years residency since the age of 50.

The other specific residency requirement depends on year of birth. For someone turning 65 years right now in late 2026, 12 years total residency since the age of 20 is required. For someone reaching the age of 65 in 2042 or later, then 20 years of residency will be required. There is a sliding age scale between now and then.

Under current eligibility rules, with an age of 65+ being the key age criterion for eligibility, the number of superannuitants is likely to increase to between 1.3 and 1.4 million by 2045. 

The next fact is that the so-called boomer population has provided the first part of a superannuation surge, but there is no bulge. The surge is going to continue.

Indeed, the coming increase in superannuitants has very little to do with boomer numbers, with boomer superannuitants starting to decline by 2030 as the members of that cohort die off. 

The oldest boomers are already aged 80 and these oldest boomers have already been steadily passing-on in recent years.

The next fact is that by 2045, under current legislation, the majority of superannuitants will be people who are currently, in 2026, aged between 45 years and 65 years.  Those numbers are predominantly ‘baked in’ already, although significant further immigration of people aged more than 45 is still occurring.

Ten years later, by 2055, it is the outsized cohorts of people currently in their 30s, who will be turning 65. These cohorts have grown more than 30% since they started off as birth cohorts! 

This high cohort-growth is because of high net-inwards migration. The number of people arriving in these age groups has far exceeded the number of locals in these age groups who have been departing. 

This is why the number of people aged more than 65 in the 2050s will be heading up towards two million. It could even exceed two million by 2060, depending very much on New Zealand’s immigration policy in the next 15 years.

The other basic fact requiring clarity is the cost of superannuation. The quoted figure currently is of the order of $25 billion per annum, increasing to around $30 billion by 2030. But dollar figures in inflationary times have little meaning. 

So, it is better to think of superannuation in terms of the proportion of GDP (i.e., gross domestic product, a key measure of national income) that it comprises. 

This year the Treasury has said that superannuation comprises 5.1 percent of GDP.  This is before the recipients pay tax on their super.

Treasury also says that if the system is left unchanged, then it will cost about 8 percent of GDP by 2065. But this depends on a lot of assumptions.

To start with, these GDP proportions do not represent what superannuitants actually receive. This is because super is taxed at source before it is paid out. 

This tax simply passes directly from the Ministry of Social Development to the Inland Revenue Department and is not sighted by superannuitants. It is directly available for the Government to spend again.

There are no published data on the average tax paid on superannuation. However, it is easy to work out that someone who relies totally on superannuation and has no other income will pay between 13 and 14 percent tax on their gross super, depending on their specific living arrangements. Around 40 percent of superannuitants are in that category. 

The remaining 60 percent of superannuitants pay more than this. For those with other income of more than $53,500, they pay 30 percent tax on their super.  Those with other incomes above $180,000 pay 39 percent of their super as tax. 

So, the real societal cost of superannuation, net of additional tax received directly by Government, is currently about 4.3 percent of GDP. We can argue about the exact number but it won’t be far away. That 4.3 percent of GDP is spread across 18 percent of the total population.

Options

If society decides that future funding of superannuation is going to be a big problem, then there are at least four ways of tackling the problem. These are to increase the age of eligibility, to means-test eligibility, to encourage voluntary contributions, or to enforce compulsory contributions from either employees or employers or both. 

Of course, none of these options is self-exclusive. There could be some combination of the above options. Or alternatively we could kick the can down the road.

Kicking the can down the road is not necessarily illogical. But it does have an opportunity cost. For example, both sides of politics seem committed to major increases in defence expenditure, which leaves me wondering where that defence money – much of it in foreign exchange for big ticket items – is going to come from. Almost everyone would also like to see more money spent on health. We do indeed have to decide what is the best use of funds.

Whatever is decided, it cannot happen by a simple majority of Parliament. There has to be a broader consensus that will hold up across the decades.

I will now look at the above options one by one. None of them are without drawbacks, and in all cases the counter issues that arise can be substantial.

Increasing the age of eligibility is by far the simplest option from an administrative perspective.  There is no direct administrative cost. But there are big indirect costs and serious social implications.

Expecting people to ‘work on the tools’ for eight hours a day beyond age 65 does not seem particularly realistic. A lot of people would need to receive some form of benefit. Indeed, there are many people younger than this already on long-term benefits. Managing that system would become an increasing industry in itself.

In New Zealand there is also a major issue in that both Māori and Pacific Islanders have a shorter lifespan and hence on average receive less years of pensions. They also belong disproportionately to the demographics who spent their working lives in physical jobs. They are also less likely than other demographics to have significant access to other income sources. 

Accordingly, increasing the age of eligibility has potential for considerable social discord.

We often read in the media that other countries are increasing the age of eligibility.  However, according to the Office of the Retirement Commissioner, 70 percent of OECD countries have no such plans to raise it above 65, and some OECD countries are below this age. France is an interesting country which in 2025 suspended plans to raise retirement age from 62 to 64 on account of social discord.

Means-testing of super is also fraught with challenges. Where should the cutoff be? Should it be based on income or assets? Of these two ways of doing it, income is by far the easiest to administer. 

Perhaps the most fundamental issue with means testing is that it causes behavioural change starting well before retirement. What is the point of saving for retirement if it means loss of a pension?

 Voluntary contributions to personalised KiwiSaver funds are the current system in New Zealand, with this having started in 2007. The current default level is 3.5 percent of gross income, which employers deduct and pay into the employees nominated scheme. Unlike some countries, this employee contribution is fully taxed and this is added to employee PAYE. 

Employers also contribute a matching compulsory 3.5 percent of employee gross income, and this is the incentive for employees to remain in the scheme. However, the current system is somewhat of a mess with confusion about whether salaries can be quoted with the employer contribution included therein.

The default level of 3.5 percent was raised from three percent in 2026 for both employees and employers. The rate rises further to four percent in 2028. However, membership by employees has always been voluntary.

Withdrawals are allowed for first-house deposits, and I note that currently, 42 percent of first-home buyers deduct funds from KiwiSaver for this purpose.  I have no argument with that, as getting on the house ownership ladder is fundamentally important for all cohorts of society. But it does reduce the effectiveness of KiwiSaver for retirement income.

Compulsory contributions to KiwiSaver are a fundamental necessity if personalised superannuation is to be effective. Otherwise, the temptations are to spend rather than save, and then rely on a national pension scheme for retirement. Those temptations mess up any voluntary scheme. 

If we want to look at how such a compulsory scheme can operate, then all we have to do is look across the Tasman to Australia. Their scheme may have its flaws, but has undoubtedly reduced the future superannuation problem in that country. 

This has happened because individual Australians have had the question of saving for retirement taken away from them. Since 2025, all Australians receive a 12 percent employer contribution into their personalised super fund.  This employer contribution is in addition to quoted wages and incurs a flat tax of 15 percent paid from within the fund.  Earnings are taxed at concessionary rates and withdrawals from the personalised fund are not taxed. A retired person can withdraw their super once they reach 60, but those who continue in employment still receive employer contributions. 

The Australian system has been operating across Australia since 1992, with the employer contribution rate increasing over time. This system operates alongside a government pension scheme that has strict means-testing of assets. Around 55 percent of retirees still rely on that means-tested pension for at least part of their living expenses. 

Before getting too excited about the Australian scheme as an option for New Zealand, a number of cautionary notes need to be considered.

First, the Australian system was brought in at a time when the Australian economy was moving forward at a rapid pace, very different to the current New Zealand economy. 

Second, there was agreement by the Government and the unions that wages would need to be restrained given the cost to employers.

Third, taxation concessions have been a key component of the Australian scheme. Those concessions come at a significant cost to Government revenue.

Fourth, even after 35 years, the scheme is still getting up to speed.

Fifth, if New Zealand were to now bring in such a scheme at the Australian level, employers would be likely to reduce staff. This emphasises that the New Zealand economic climate is very different to when Australia brought in its scheme.

And sixth, in economics there is no such thing as a free lunch. Each lunch requires something else to be foregone.

Finally, with New Zealand default rates for the voluntary KiwiSaver scheme already legislated to rise to four percent for both employees and employers in 2028, it can be argued that New Zealand has the framework for an Australian-type system already in place. 

The fundamental missing step is compulsory membership. Thereafter the devil will be in the detail. And there is lots of controversial detail that would still have to be agreed across the political divides. 

Also, there is a reality that total contributions of eight percent will not be sufficient for the superannuation problem to go away. That is why Australia has gone to 12 percent. Ouch!

Stepping back to look at the big picture, no-one should make the mistake of thinking there is an easy solution. In recent decades we have been living, until perhaps the last six or so years, in a time of increasing abundance. With natural resources increasingly constrained by nature itself, that abundance is now going to be sorely tested. 

Having a combination of an ever-increasing number of pensioners, plus ongoing significant immigrant numbers, will create a long-term situation with increasing social discord. 

Despite what Mr Musk might think, there is only one planet.


*Keith Woodford ONZM was Professor of Farm Management and Agribusiness at Lincoln University for 15 years through to 2015. He is now Principal Consultant at AgriFood Systems Ltd. You can contact him directly here.

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