Carolina Alves argues that using the wrong tool to manage price growth fueled by war and structural shifts is a political choice

For much of 2025 and early 2026, central banks have framed their decision to hold interest rates steady as an exercise in prudence. With inflation once again edging upward even as growth slows, institutions like the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have emphasised patience and “data dependence” as the responsible course, an approach shaped above all by lingering fears of recession.

That stance has pushed the policy debate toward a familiar question: How long can central banks resist raising interest rates? But that framing misses the point. The real issue is not the pace of monetary tightening; it is whether policymakers can maintain the fiction that higher interest rates are an effective, or even neutral, response to the inflationary pressures advanced economies currently face.

Today’s inflationary pressures are not being fueled by overheated labour markets or surging consumer demand. They reflect higher energy prices, geopolitical conflict, climate-related disruptions, fragile supply chains, and—increasingly—the pricing power of large corporations. Given that the problem is not excessive borrowing or spending, raising interest rates does little to address inflation’s underlying causes.

These pressures are likely to intensify. The United Arab Emirates’ recent decision to exit OPEC is about more than an internal dispute within a commodity cartel. It signals a deeper structural shift in the political economy of energy, marked by changing power dynamics in global oil markets and the weakening capacity of existing institutions to manage a resource that is both highly financialised and geopolitically fraught.

Because OPEC’s influence has long rested on its members’ restraint, the UAE’s departure undermines the bloc’s traditional role in managing supply. With one of its largest and most flexible producers breaking away, coordination becomes harder to sustain, increasing market volatility. Oil markets, in turn, are responding less to collective strategy than to fragmentation, geopolitical risk, and unilateral decision-making.

As a result, central banks find themselves in an increasingly uncomfortable position. If they keep interest rates lower for much longer, they risk eroding their credibility as headline inflation ticks upward. Conversely, raising rates too aggressively could deepen recessionary pressures, exacerbate private and public debt burdens, and further squeeze households already battered by rising food, housing, and energy costs.

Against this backdrop, monetary authorities are not freely choosing between clear policy options. They are operating within tight structural constraints imposed by financial markets, fiscal fragility, and political pressures, especially when it comes to unemployment. Markets, for their part, increasingly anticipate rate hikes not because they will solve inflation, but because central banks feel compelled to act, even when their tools are ill-suited to the task.

The distributional consequences of that policy reflex are often overlooked. Higher interest rates act as a disciplinary mechanism: they protect asset values, reward creditors, and shift the burden of adjustment onto workers, mortgage holders, and heavily indebted countries. Casting inflation as a labour-market problem, even though it is driven by energy monopolies, geopolitical tensions, and supply disruptions, is a political choice, not an economic necessity. In reality, higher interest rates do not eliminate inflation so much as redistribute its costs through higher unemployment, increased household debt, and fiscal retrenchment. This is not an unintended side effect of monetary policy, but the mechanism through which inflation is typically managed.

That reality has done little to shift the terms of debate. Policymakers continue to treat inflation as a monetary problem rather than a structural and distributional one. Central banks respond by tightening financial conditions, but higher interest rates do nothing to reduce food prices, which reflect surging fertiliser and energy costs. They do, however, raise the risk of job losses, mortgage distress, and entrenched poverty.

If inflation remains elevated for years, the problem becomes one of social exhaustion. Households cannot keep absorbing higher costs without long-term damage, from rising indebtedness to poorer nutrition and worsening health outcomes. At that point, inflation is no longer just an economic issue but a source of political instability, potentially leading to a crisis of institutional legitimacy.

These dynamics underscore the limits of central banks’ current approach. As inflation becomes closely tied to climate shocks, war, and the strategic control of essential resources, monetary policy alone cannot stabilise prices without imposing serious social and economic costs. Higher interest rates may suppress demand, but they cannot produce oil and natural gas, unblock ports, repair supply chains, or reduce corporate markups.

Central banks can delay rate increases, move gradually, or embrace “optional pauses.” But such tactical adjustments do not resolve the underlying contradiction: policymakers are using a technocratic instrument designed for demand management to curb price increases driven by structural and political forces.

Until that contradiction is addressed—through coordinated energy policy, public investment, price regulation, industrial strategy, or active fiscal intervention—interest rates will continue to oscillate without resolving the problem they are meant to solve. Monetary tightening will remain a symbolic gesture to convey control rather than a real solution.

At its core, policymakers’ continued reliance on interest rates to manage crises stemming from the interplay between energy markets, corporate power, and geopolitical conflict reflects how inflation is framed. Treating structural inflation as a demand-management problem allows policymakers to appear decisive while avoiding a more difficult confrontation with those who set prices, control resources, and extract rents. That, too, is a policy choice—one whose social costs are becoming harder to ignore.

Carolina Alves is Associate Professor in Economics at the Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose at University College London and a fellow at the University of Cambridge’s Girton College. Project Syndicate, (c) 2026, published here with permission.