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Paolia Subacchi thinks US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's efforts to move bond markets shows that the US dollar remains everyone's problem

Currencies / opinion
Paolia Subacchi thinks US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's efforts to move bond markets shows that the US dollar remains everyone's problem
Liz Truss over Scott Bessent's shoulder

By Paola Subacchi

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has a packed agenda. Alongside trying to crash Iran’s economy, he is concerned about the cost of servicing federal debt, which surpassed 100% of GDP earlier this year. Interest payments on America’s debt have shot up to more than $1 trillion this year, exceeding annual US defense spending.

To keep a lid on Treasury yields, Bessent—who spent most of his career in capital markets, notably at Soros Fund Management, where he helped “break” the British pound in September 1992—is now seeking to move market sentiment from the other side of the fence.

First came a joint intervention by the US and Japan to prop up a weak yen. To raise the dollars required on its own, Japan would have had to sell US Treasuries. Japan is the largest holder of US debt and has long been a reliable buyer, putting around 25 cents of every surplus dollar into Treasuries for the past two decades. A forced sale would have been a very public break from precedent.

The next step revealed Bessent’s real concern. He suggested that, instead of selling securities, Japan could gain access to dollars to buttress the yen through the Foreign and International Monetary Authorities Repo Facility, which has been little used since the pandemic. He also proposed using the facility to relieve pressure on the US bond market, as well as raising its borrowing ceiling to support dollar funding more widely.

Most recently, Bessent has turned his attention to demand, with a commitment to double long-dated buybacks to “at least” $4 billion per operation. Here the arithmetic doesn’t add up. The US Federal Reserve can bend a yield curve because it operates in larger amounts—at the height of the pandemic, its daily Treasury purchases peaked at roughly $75 billion. But the Treasury cannot do the same. It pays for long-dated buybacks by selling short-dated debt, reducing the duration of America’s debt while claiming to steady long-term Treasury yields.

This sequence of interventions has not delivered the expected outcome: the 30-year yield, which reached its highest level since 2007 right before Bessent’s buyback announcement, fell temporarily but soon bounced back. It has also confused bondholders. That puts Bessent—the self-described “nation’s top bond salesman”—in an uncomfortable position.

At around $30 trillion, the US debt market is huge and liquid. But the attempted intervention is concerning, as is an administration showing no fiscal restraint. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the national debt will reach 108% of GDP by 2030 and 120% by 2036. A major driver is interest on existing bonds. The low-rate pandemic window was used to borrow rather than pay down debt, leaving more to refinance once rates rose.

The race that matters is between the interest rate the government pays and the rate at which the economy grows, with the latter ideally outpacing the former. That has been the case in the United States for two decades, but the CBO projects that the gap will close around 2031, after which stabilizing the debt ratio will require outright surpluses. Meanwhile, inflation remains above the Fed’s 2% target.

President Donald Trump has embraced the view that the world has been freeloading on US debt, and that the terms should change. Whether his administration acts on that view remains an open question, but the genie is out of the bottle.

A similar question hangs over the Fed, which came under pressure from the White House to cut interest rates during former Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s final months in office. Powell’s successor, Kevin Warsh, has not yet felt Trump’s breathing down his neck, but that seems like a matter of when, not if. The consequences could be profound: the Fed’s ability to stabilize markets depends on its perceived independence from politics.

Thirty years is a long time for a creditor to trust a debtor. Will they repay the debt in full or try to inflate it away? It is not surprising, then, that the Treasury’s buybacks reduce the duration of federal debt.

But the marginal buyers of that short-term debt are now domestic, private, and more price-sensitive than central banks are. That means the US government, which is issuing bonds at record volumes, is drawing from the same pool of domestic savings as large-scale corporate borrowers. At that point, the yield needed to clear the market becomes a relevant factor.

Far from suggesting financial Armageddon, the current situation recalls that described in 1971 by then-US Treasury Secretary John Connally, after the US government unilaterally abandoned dollar convertibility: “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.” Treasury holders like Japan, China, and European countries are not running for the exit just yet, but they are looking for one—and finding few options.

The problem is simple: no other market can absorb the same volume. The German Bund market is around $2.3 trillion. Japan’s bond market is larger, at around $7.6 trillion, but the Bank of Japan owns roughly 43% of it. The dollar’s share of global reserves has decreased slowly, from nearly 70% in 2000 to under 59% in 2024, precisely because reserve managers have nowhere else to turn. The US, not its creditors, holds the pricing power, and foreign holdings reflect structural necessity, not strategic choice.

But even as sovereign buyers continue to purchase Treasuries for exchange-rate management, crisis insurance, and trade settlement in a dollar-priced world, the bond-salesman-in-chief cannot be complacent. Tampering with markets may fail to deliver the expected result and, at worst, trigger instability across asset classes, as the British gilt and even the German bund are already under pressure. The risk of another “Liz Truss moment”—when the UK prime minister resigned after sending the gilt market into freefall in 2022—is never far away.


Paola Subacchi is Professor and Chair in Sovereign Debt at Sciences Po. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2026, and published here with permission.

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6 Comments

The problem is that there is more debt that there is planet remaining. 

Debt being a demand for future parts of said planet. 

Hence Musk and space - it's the only bet big enough (but of course, will never deliver, because of physics). 

A reconciliation between assumed guarantees of forward bets, vs actual underwrite, is the reason for everything since 1970, including Trump. 

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Second to last paragraph... "The US, not its creditors, holds the pricing power, and foreign holdings reflect structural necessity, not strategic choice."

That statement really hit me between the eyes. 

Subacchi and the Blind Spot of the Institutional Narrative

In her analysis of U.S. Treasury interventions, Paola Subacchi relies on a foundational narrative of the FIC  (Financial-Industrial Complex) - that the sheer size, liquidity, and historical dominance of the U.S. debt market create an inescapable "structural necessity" for the Rest of the World (RoW). 

She invokes John Connally’s famous 1971 dictum—"the dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem"—to argue that global creditors have nowhere else to turn.

Obviously this perspective suffers from a profound recency bias. It treats a transient, fiat-based geopolitical arrangement as an immutable law of nature. When you look at the shifting mechanics of global reserves through the lens of sovereign self-preservation, it immediately becomes clear that Subacchi’s "structural necessity" is rapidly devolving into a strategic liability. 

The RoW is actively rejecting the role of passive financier to its own subordination, systematically engineering an exit from the dollar-denominated architecture.


The Deconstruction of "Pricing Power" and "Structural Necessity"

Subacchi asserts that because alternative sovereign bond markets (like the German Bund or Japanese Government Bonds) lack the depth to absorb global surpluses, the U.S. retains absolute pricing power. This argument incorrectly assumes that the only alternative to a US-treasury is another Western nation's fiat debt asset.

The contemporary reality is a structural pivot toward tangible and decentralised reserves:

Hard-Backed Trade Settlement: Other major currencies are increasingly utilised not as passive stores of value to be held for decades, but as rapid, hard-backed transactional vehicles for direct bilateral trade.

Commodity and PM Accumulation: Global central banks are rotating away from paper liabilities toward physical Precious Metals (PMs) and durable commodities. Gold, energy reserves, and industrial metals cannot be frozen by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). They carry no counterparty or political risk.

The Valuation Pivot: As sovereign demand shifts from U.S. paper to physical assets, the U.S. loses its traditional non-price-sensitive buyers (foreign central banks). This shifts the marginal pricing of U.S. debt to domestic, price-sensitive private investors, forcing yields higher and stripping the U.S. Treasury of its dictated pricing power.
 

Financing Victimhood: The Awakening of the Global Creditor

Perhaps the most glaring omission in Subacchi’s analysis is the political economy of debt ownership. She views Japan, China, and European nations merely as "reserve managers" balancing exchange rates. She ignores the profound geopolitical feedback loop that your observation highlights: buying the debt of a financial and military hegemony actively finances the creditor's own systemic vulnerability.

When the U.S. weaponised the SWIFT network and froze the sovereign foreign exchange reserves of a G20 nation, it shattered the foundational myth of the risk-free asset. The RoW realised that accumulating U.S. debt is not a neutral act of "crisis insurance" - it is the direct funding of a unilateral global police force that can, at any moment, use those very assets as leverage against the creditor. The momentum toward diversification is therefore driven by an existential imperative to break this cycle of self-financed victimization.
 

The Maths of Decay: Crowding Out and the Illusion of Permanence

Subacchi notes that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects U.S. national debt to breach 120% of GDP by 2036*, with interest payments already consuming over $1 trillion annually. Yet, she fails to connect her own data to the inevitable end of the dollar's structural necessity.
*(farcical in itself - one the stagflationary debt-doom-trap kicks in with a vengeance it will quickly become multiples of that number)  

When a debtor's interest obligations eclipse its defense spending and its economic growth rate, the promise to "repay in full" becomes mathematically impossible without hyper-inflating the currency. 

The shift toward a multi-currency ecosystem is a rational market response to an insolvent debtor. As trusted trading partners set up alternative clearing mechanisms outside the dollar, the network effects that once protected the greenback are reversing.
 

Conclusion: The Genie Out of the Bottle

Subacchi’s conclusion that Treasury holders are "finding few options" completely misreads the horizon. 

The options are not being found in Western capital markets; they are being actively built through parallel financial plumbing, commodity-backed trade arrangements, and decentralised settlement systems.

The "Liz Truss moment" she warns about is not a distant risk - it is the logical mathematical conclusion of an empire that believed its creditors would indefinitely finance their own subordination. The structural necessity of the past has become the strategic vulnerability of the present, and the RoW is choosing to walk away.

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Bond market 1 - Bessent 0.  The bond market will always win.  Also Bessent has involuntarily signalled to the whole world: "The US fiscal situation is dire"

 

The race that matters is between the interest rate the government pays and the rate at which the economy grows, with the latter ideally outpacing the former.

This show that the USA is in deep trouble with inflation about 3+% higher than GDP.  This is not about to get better.

Treasury holders like Japan, China, and European countries are not running for the exit just yet, but they are looking for one—and finding few options.

That exit has a name, its called GOLD.

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As China is doing, a slow, steady exit is better than creating a panic and another GFC with a massive sell-off. Smart investors will have been slowly divesting from US equities for a year or two already at the expense of some gains via the AI boom, as they realise this is the smartest option to preserve what they have vs risk adding to a panic and losing much more in a sharp crash. That, and getting some gold as part of their portfolio.

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Slowly...then all of a sudden.

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All of a sudden doesn't benefit China, which is why their fuel strategy of buying cheap form Iran and Russia and storing so much, and their action to stop buying in volumes when prices hiked, shows they understand the need to slowly move away from the USD. Their exports would take a significant hit if it was all at once, and they are one of the most able to influence or buffer shocks internationally given their scale and manufacturing prowess.

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