Labour formally announces monetary policy 'full employment' mandate alongside price stability for Reserve Bank; New OCR-setting committee would allow Treasury input but no vote alongside RBNZ Governors and three externals

Labour formally announces monetary policy 'full employment' mandate alongside price stability for Reserve Bank; New OCR-setting committee would allow Treasury input but no vote alongside RBNZ Governors and three externals

Labour has formally announced its desire for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to use monetary policy to try and target full employment alongside its price stability mandate.

It has also outlined how it would change the Official Cash Rate (OCR) setting process, with a voting committee of the RBNZ Governor, two Deputy Governors and Chief Economist to be joined by three external appointees. Treasury will have a non-voting input.

Labour finance spokesman Grant Robertson announced the policy Monday morning, ahead of a midday speech to a Victoria University symposium on monetary policy.

This follows a report on Saturday that Finance Minister Steven Joyce had requested the State Services Commissioner look into the merits of a formal OCR rate setting committee; RBNZ governor Graeme Wheeler already runs an informal one with his two deputies and one assistant governor.

Back to the future

The policy reveals how Labour would look to alter Section 8 of the Reserve Bank Act, which stipulates the objective of the Bank’s monetary policy function as price stability. By including full employment alongside price stability, the bank would be given a dual mandate for monetary policy.

Robertson has based the inclusion of a full employment target on central bank legislation in Australia and the United States. “The evidence is that those countries who have a dual mandate perform better or as well as those with a single mandate at managing inflation,” it says in the policy announcement.

Australia’s Reserve Bank Act was introduced in 1959, while the US Federal Reserve Reform Act was introduced in 1977. New Zealand’s latest Reserve Bank Act came into force in 1989. Read Alex Tarrant’s article here on how the New Zealand Act previously referenced employment goals (1950 and 1969 revisions) before the Lange Labour government removed mention in 1989.

Dual or duel mandate?

The change Labour is proposing to the Act is not set to include explicit reference to when the Bank should favour full employment or price stability over the other.

But, Robertson told the Bank itself would at times in the economic cycle be expected to communicate which of the two mandates it was leaning more towards, if any, similar to his comment to Brian Fallow in March.

Likewise, Robertson said Labour was not proposing the Policy Targets Agreements between the Minister of Finance and the RBNZ Governor would state a preferred mandate. While Labour would keep an inflation target in the PTA (Robertson mentioned 1-3%), it will not nominate a specific nominal employment or unemployment goal, he confirmed.

If the proposed changes had been in place over the past few years, Robertson said he believed the inclusion of a full employment goal alongside price stability would have meant the Bank would not have raised the OCR as it did in 2009 and 2014. It could have indicated at the time that, because of low inflation, it was putting more weight to its employment goal, he said.

Treasury input in OCR decision

Meanwhile, the changes to the rate setting process would effectively allow the Finance Minister, via a Treasury official, a seat at the table. Labour is proposing one Treasury official sits on the new rate-setting committee, although this person would be the only one without voting power.

Robertson told this move was designed to allow Treasury to provide input on the government’s fiscal forecasts and the fiscal policy track.

The Treasury official would sit alongside three voting appointees from outside the Bank and Treasury, the Governor, two Deputy Governors and the Bank’s Chief Economist, in a move modelled on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee.

The three externals would be appointed by the Bank’s Governor, in consultation with the Minister of Finance, Robertson told He envisaged they would more likely be academics or recently retired public sector people rather than current private sector appointees like CEOs of major companies.

Potential conflicts of interest would be dealt with by having minutes of the rate-setting committee’s meetings published within three weeks, noting dissenting views. Robertson said the external appointees would likely be limited by statute in what they could say on monetary policy outside of the meetings.

Read the full announcement from Labour below:

28 years on from the passing of the Reserve Bank Act much has changed in the way the global economy and the New Zealand economy operates. The failure to meet our agreed inflation goals for the past four years has raised questions about whether monetary policy is making a decisive difference to the successful operation of the economy.

In the face of this evidence we believe the time is right to review the Reserve Bank Act. Our approach would fully protect the independence of the Bank - whilst allowing monetary policy to play its part in meeting the economic goals of the country.

At the outset of this process we want to signal two proposed changes to the Reserve Bank Act 1989. We also want the review to consider the adequacy and relevance of the measures and tools used by the Reserve Bank, and will work with the Bank on this once in government as part of the review.

1) Broadening of the objective of the Bank (Section 8 of the Act) from just price stability to also include a commitment to full employment.

We have seen the damage that out of control inflation can do to our economy and to our citizens. It is our most vulnerable who are the most affected by rising prices. It is right that we should continue to have price stability as a focus of monetary policy. It would be our intention to continue the inflation goals currently in the Policy Targets Agreement.

The next Labour government is also determined to focus on the creation of decent work with high wages. We want all parts of our economic system working towards that goal. Countries like the US and Australia have commitments for full employment within their Central Bank legislation. The evidence is that those countries who have a dual mandate perform better or as well as those with a single mandate at managing inflation.

2) Change to the decision making process of the Bank so that a Committee, including external appointees, will have responsibility for setting the Official Cash Rate. The Committee will publish the minutes of its decision within three weeks, noting any dissenting views

Having a single decision maker for OCR decisions is out of step with international practice. We propose that the existing governing committee of the Reserve Bank be joined by three independent experts. We would expect them to make a substantial time commitment to this work. The appointment of the experts would remain in the hands of the Governor, though would be subject to scrutiny as part of the Finance and Expenditure’s review of the Bank.

To help sustain public confidence in the system, we are proposing putting the minutes of each meeting of the Committee on-line within three weeks, including the result of any vote. This is done in a number of other jurisdictions. It is important that a public institution making as important decisions like the Reserve Bank, has this level of public transparency.

RBNZ Staff would continue to prepare projections and financial information for the Committee. The RBNZ Board would still have retrospective oversight of the committee’s decisions, and would hold it to account for any systematic errors or omissions.

We welcome your help to improve our coverage of this issue. Any examples or experiences to relate? Any links to other news, data or research to shed more light on this? Any insight or views on what might happen next or what should happen next? Any errors to correct?

We welcome your comments below. If you are not already registered, please register to comment.

Remember we welcome robust, respectful and insightful debate. We don't welcome abusive or defamatory comments and will de-register those repeatedly making such comments. Our current comment policy is here.


Comment Filter

Highlight new comments in the last hr(s).

Labour has formally announced its desire for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to use monetary policy to try and target full employment alongside its price stability mandate.

With which tools? Hope?

Bond yields are not a reflection of monetary policy directly, but rather what monetary policy actually means outside of all the rhetoric. In the years since 2011, market perceptions of monetary policy, including related measures like inflation expectations, have come to almost perfectly and consistently match contrary indications of actual “dollar” conditions that still, to this day, suggest there is nothing good about the global money system or the Fed’s role in it. Read more

The idea that interest rates have nowhere to go but up is very much like saying the bond market has it all wrong. That is one reason why the rhetoric has been ratcheted that much higher of late, particularly since the Fed “raised rates” for a third time in March. Such “hawkishness” by convention should not go so unnoticed, and yet yields and curves are once more paying little attention to Janet Yellen. When Mohamed El-Erian wrote in what was I guess an oped in the Financial Times on Monday that bond investors were “distracted”, it was his subtle way of attacking them as wrong. Read more

I don't think so.

will the government allow the new rate setting committee adjust immigration, easy way to fix full employment and boost inflation.
also what do you class as full employment most countries now class it around the 4.5% writting off that part of the workforce as unproductice and unemployable
talk about pass the buck, it is up to the governemnt party in power to set the conditions for this
on the committee itself i have no problem with that, as long as the makeup is right

Probably not the time to be proposing this, but should they get in to power, they should initiate an examination of the OCR rate setting mechanism, particularly at very low inflation rates. To me the last 8 years have illustrated that there is a strong link between lowering the OCR and promoting asset bubbles, but only a very weak link between a low OCR and investment in the productive economy, and the economic growth that they are trying to stimulate.

Video of Robertson's speech in there now.

So Labours response to RBNZ's consistent failure to achieve the price stability target is to extend that target to include a problem that doesn't exist. Sounds reasonable.

It breaks my heart to see how far out of touch our moronic politicians are.
The last 10 years should at least be warning signals but they waltz on , career prospects intact.
Sell the dream, dodge the flak, plan for the knighthood.

yeah I think most of them get very deluded over time. Living in their own little bubble.
I'm convinced the whole politician's career, by necessity, breeds a degree of thick skin that results in arrogance / lack of empathy.
Would be interested to see a psychologists take on the career politician's personality.

Well a thick skin is sometimes required.
Grow up.

A thick skin is only good up to a point.....

Memo to Grant Robertson and Labour: the RBNZ does not create fact, it never has and it never will. Hard working individuals and small businesses have always done the real work there, which has always been the case. As for low interest rates, if Grant believes that the RBNZ will/can be the ultimate controller of interest rates then he will receive a valuable education on why this is a naive belief over the coming years. Yes, low interest rates might keep govt finances afloat while they keep ramping up debt levels, and I can understand why he wants to keep it that way. However, pension funds are going bankrupt all over the world at these rates and when capital starts to exit govt bonds (which are anything but low risk), then the policy settings of the RBNZ will be the least of Grant's problems. Unless, of course, he decides to do a Venezuela monetary policy to try and overpower those pesky individuals who choose not to surrender everything to the state.

There goes labours election, no voter will ever give government control of their home or business loan rates...