Fonterra’s sale of its consumer brands to an overseas owner marks the end of an era.
There was always a structural tension within the co-operative between the ideal business structure for ingredients versus consumer brands. Perhaps it was inevitable that there would be an eventual parting of the ways.
Whether or not the sale to French company Lactalis of the consumer-focused division for $4.2 billion is the best outcome for New Zealand is a moot point. My own preference would have been a public company headquartered in New Zealand, with Fonterra retaining a minority interest.
Despite knowing that change had to occur, with a co-operative not the natural owner of a consumer-products marketing company, I am uneasy. Retaining a minority interest in a consumer company would have kept Fonterra closer to consumer-market signals.
However, the potential large-scale investors, such as the public and private KiwiSaver companies, and perhaps ACC, did not see sufficient value to match the bid from French company Lactalis. In an open capital economy, it is dollars that count and the Kiwi investors did not front up.
So, if there is someone to blame, it is not Fonterra, but the broader New Zealand investor community.
I have written many times over the last 20 years about the tensions involved in Fonterra, as a co-operative, trying to span the void between marketing of long-life ingredients and short-life consumer goods.
In essence, an ingredients company is technology-based, underpinned by science, logistics and business-to business relationships. In contrast, consumer marketing is very much about understanding consumers and reacting quickly to evolving trends. The leadership and thinking-skills needed for these two types of business are very different.
Another fundamental difference between these two types of business is capital intensity. Also, a global consumer business needs considerable staff in each market.
Top-down decision-making does not work in a fast-moving consumer business. Head Office has to understand and respond quickly to the specific complexities of each market.
This is only possible if the key decision-makers are deeply involved in-market. Whizz-bang tours of a few days by executives and governance-board members do not cut the mustard.
I recall back in 2006 first talking with Fonterra directors about the merits of a two-company model, with the consumer-focused company majority funded by external capital. I and others sowed the seeds, but those seeds, if they ever sprouted, soon withered. Essentially, the directors and executives of those times thought they could do it all.
Perhaps they could have done it all, but they were misled by their own rhetoric as to how to go about it.
During those early years of Fonterra, particularly from around 2005 through to about 2015, I was doing a lot of international travelling. That included multiple trips both to China and across South America, building on my earlier in-country exposures to those cultures from way back in the 1970s. I kept seeing things that Fonterra was messing up in the market place.
Fonterra is a very different company now to what it was even five years ago. Its ingredient business is much more efficient than in the past. Under Chairman Peter McBride, the Board has decided to focus on the things it does best.
Within the broader public, there has been a lot of misunderstanding about Fonterra’s consumer business. In fact, most of the products sold by that business have not been using New Zealand milk.
Instead, Fonterra has been procuring the milk in the country of destination, then processing the milk in that country for consumer products, and then branding the products as being Fonterra, with this of course being totally legitimate.
The most important consumer markets for Fonterra have been Australia, using Australian milk, and that is where the global head of Fonterra’s consumer division is currently based.
There are two fundamental reasons for this off-shore milk production. The first is the challenge of perishable products, with short shelf-life, transported long distances across international borders. The second is that New Zealand’s supply of milk is highly seasonal whereas consumer demands for the perishable products are non-seasonal.
Seasonal production, with almost all dairy cows calving in spring and very few cows milking in winter, is a unique New Zealand system which works well but only for long-life products. Milk powders, butter, some cheeses, and infant formula, are the classic long-life examples.
Looking Forward
Now that divestment of the consumer business has been determined as the path ahead, there is no point in dwelling unduly on spilled milk. The big questions now are how can Fonterra maximise returns from specialised ingredients and food-service products.
Food-service is another part of the industry for which there is widespread misunderstanding by the general public. Food service requires Fonterra to work directly with in-country chefs from large companies using specialised ingredients and standardised food production systems. I recall some 15 years ago devouring trial products in Fonterra’s Shanghai food-development kitchen. Since then, the food service category has grown greatly.
Food service involves working close to the market but it is still a business-to-business operation. Increasingly, it refers to specialised products such as mozzarella cheese and bulk-whipped cream. Of course, it also includes butter, with New Zealand butter derived from grass-feed animals having a distinctive texture and colour.
To date, Fonterra has not done a good job of educating the commentariat, including some politicians, as to the differences between food service, specialised ingredients and commodities, and how each sits differently within the value chain.
Fonterra will always produce some commodities. This reflects the simple fact that seasonal production creates a flood of milk in October, November, and December, with this creating its own priority of getting the milk quickly to a shelf-stable state. Turning it into whole-milk-powder which is then sold in bulk is how this is done. Fonterra is a genuine global leader in milk powder.
Ironically, milk produced on New Zealand farms requires the addition of imported lactose to meet international commodity certification standards for whole milk powder. This means that New Zealand manufactured milk powder is not a pure New Zealand-sourced product. It contains an imported ingredient.
In passing, I note that Fonterra will continue to own the Anchor brand in China but not in New Zealand or elsewhere. That is another irony.
The ‘bottom line’ of what is happening in the New Zealand dairy industry is that dairy exports are going to remain New Zealand’s most important export category. Let there be no doubt about that. Within that framework, the specific products will continue to evolve.
*Keith Woodford was Professor of Farm Management and Agribusiness at Lincoln University for 15 years through to 2015. He is now Principal Consultant at AgriFood Systems Ltd. You can contact him directly here.
19 Comments
I don't understand the uproar from Winnie and co when the consumer brands businesses are less than 10% of Fonterra's sales. Hardly "nationally significant".
The decision to sell is a big strategic decision and is of national significance. However, I am not convinced that politicians have a good understanding of the complex issues.
KeithW
Keith, do you think the short-term "sugar rush" payout to farmers/NZ from the sale outweighs the longer term profits from selling the consumer products (which I assume will now largely head offshore)?
I would not use the term 'sugar rush'. I am hoping that farmers do indeed in the main use the payout of capital to further reduce debt. That would create a more resilient industry. From a farmer perspective, there is confidence that Fonterra has made a good decision that is built on logic. Taking a broader NZ perspective, I think it is disappointing that the broader investment community did not see an opportunity to step up. This would have been a publicly listed company outside the co-operative structure. That was very much what I hoped would happen. And I think that would have been in the greater interests of New Zealand. Accordingly, my criticisms are aimed towards the broader investment community rather than towards Fonterra.
KeithW
If it is factual that most of NZ’s pasture suitable for dairying is already thus occupied a question then arises as to how the business can now grow in terms of revenue. That is aside from rising market prices and after the efficiencies gained from streamlining production to commodity are bedded in. In other words the milk coming in and the product(s) going out are more or less flat lined. Is there then to be any serious consideration to adapting more land to dairying by adopting the various barn systems that operate in such as in Europe?
I am an advocate for wintering barns based on composting principles but that is very different from the 365-day barn systems of Europe. I am critical that the NZ R&D system has largely ignored the potential of composting barns. This R&D dereliction in regard to working on these challenges is something that I will have more to say about in future.
KeithW
Thanks and yes it is quite obvious that modern technology must be employed in order to broaden the production base. At the other end too there are efficiencies to be considered with regard to beef meat production which is quite more than just a by product. Most dairying cattle end up as frozen grinding meat for lucrative markets mostly as North America. This meat can be warmed boned and as such does not involve the cost of traditional freezing works such as pre & post chillers, itemised boning and special packaging such as vacuum. Plants simplified to just that processing would reduce much of the present overhead costs.
I have heard on the grapevine that the cow bedding has gone from being a waste wood product to a significant input cost. Do you have any figures on that. The setup costs aren't light also
I agree that bedding is a significant cost. A key issue is getting the evaporation effect ('chimney' effect) to work to maximise bedding life. When things are working well the life can be multiple years. Yes, setup costs can be major. I am currently working with a farmer who has recently built a large composting barn and is working on a four-year payback.
KeithW
I recall you wrote here about moo-tels 4 or 5 years ago, I don't normally remember things so clearly but this stuck. I've had a passing interest in the concept ever since, and see there are some fancy methods for collecting effluent at sub-floor level (herdhome?) I'm a cheap and cheerful solutions type, I don't know if there are any
Herd homes are a different concept, typically with slatted floor and effluent held below this. They do tend to be smelly. Composting barns work on a different set of principles. it is important for the compost to warm up to at least 50 degrees as part of the composting process and for all moisture to evaporate. This is entirely feasible but there is also great scope for things to go wrong with poor design and/or poor management. Much of this is a consequence of there being no research, development and extension system to guide farmer decisions.
KeithW
Fronterra have reduced themselves to a commodity supplier, selling entirely to hard-eyed professionals who buy on specification and know exactly how much it costs to produce a certain item, rather than unwitting consumers who can be swayed by meaningless 'brands'. And while consumer sales may have been a small proportion of turnover, what was the profitability like?
It's going to be narrower margins now they have relinquished control of a potentially very profitable part of their supply chain becasue they apparently can't cope with the complexity.
And it won't help the wider economy, as anyone sane would be retiring debt as fast as they could, given bank rates may not stay low and returns may shrink.
Been over this endlessly. The return on equity has been consistently (25years plus) half of the return from so called commodities.
Thanks for the info - and I do wonder about the mechanics of how that's possible.
The Golem, I think you have missed what I have said about specialised ingredients and food-service. Buyers of those products tend to 'lock in' to a particular supplier.
KeithW
I did industrial and manufacturing supply chain management for 30 years, and while we always attempted to build the vital vendor relationships, said vendors had to convince us their margins were reasonable in our relentless quest for lowest total cost. The cost pressure was always down, and we knew what we were buying.
Losing control of vertical integration of this nature has the potential to hand a lot of leverage to buyers.
The margins on consumer dairy goods are good when milk prices are soft, providing an offset to the losses.
Now our whole country is even more at the whims of the milk price. Long may it stay high.
Well it was a unanimous decision to dispense with the consumer dairy goods rather than improve and expand the relative market performance. Therefore the majority of shareholders will be responsible should the reliance entirely on commodity not work out so good. However given that branded retail was only a smallish part of the whole operation the resultant dynamics may not become all that noticeable.
Specialised ingredients and food service are not commodities. The challenge will be to further expand these products.
KeithW
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