sign up log in
Want to go ad-free? Find out how, here.

Reserve Bank now says 'there may be value in waiting' before removing LVRs, or just easing the restrictions rather than removing them altogether

Public Policy / news
Reserve Bank now says 'there may be value in waiting' before removing LVRs, or just easing the restrictions rather than removing them altogether
slow-down

The Reserve Bank is conceding lessons have been learned from its disastrous decision to remove restrictions on high loan to value ratio (LVR) mortgage lending in April 2020.

But it has stopped short of calling the removal a mistake.

I said at the time the decision was announced that I thought it "was a bombshell and may be a very bad call".

Subsequently New Zealand's house prices rose more than 40% and investors particularly - who most benefited from the removal - filled their boots, with the amount they borrowed tripling in short order after removal of the LVRs.

By late 2020 the RBNZ was announcing LVRs would come back and they were duly reintroduced in 2021 as the housing market continued to roar away.

In an RBNZ article reflecting on a decade of use of macro-prudential policy, authors Chris McDonald and Shaun Markham say now; "in uncertain situations there may be value in waiting before removing restrictions".

"Alternatively, more measured adjustments could be taken such as easing LVR restrictions rather than removing them altogether."

They say in terms of the RBNZ's initial actions in removing LVRs, "we found that LVR settings were able to be loosened quickly in a little over a week but reinstating them required much longer".

"It takes time to consult publicly when tightening and banks also need time to adjust their pipeline of preapproved loans."

In another part of the same article, the authors expand further on this, saying that when an opportunity to ease LVR restrictions arises, it could be prudent to wait longer before doing so, given the requirements of tightening LVR restrictions again "if the decision turned out to be wrong in hindsight".

"Our experience during 2020 and 2021 highlights this challenge. After we removed LVR restrictions at the onset of the pandemic, high-risk mortgage lending increased and by late 2020 we had started the process of re-establishing LVR settings. However, the process took time and settings were only restored to their pre-pandemic level in March 2021."

Going back to the beginning, the authors say that in April 2020 the RBNZ was concerned that an acute tightening of financial conditions could reinforce any slowdown in the economy by further dampening investment and spending.

"It was important to break that negative feedback loop by removing potential barriers to accessing credit.

"We also did not want to impede banks from supporting their customers through the anticipated challenges.

"There was a concern that LVR restrictions could potentially impede the mortgage deferral scheme, which was implemented to make it easier for banks to support customers with temporary cashflow issues."

McDonald and Markham say that by the end of 2020, it had become clear that the New Zealand economy was stronger than expected at the time of the initial response.

"In particular, the housing market was much stronger as low mortgage rates led to accelerating house price growth," they said.

"Strong growth in house prices occurred alongside an increase in high-risk lending, which posed risks to financial stability.

"While the share of high-LVR loans on banks’ mortgage books were at historic lows, we had concerns that a large flow of new high-LVR lending would lead to a deterioration in banks’ lending portfolios if left unchecked.

"Investor activity was particularly strong given investors were more sensitive to interest rates and that they were previously more constrained by LVR restrictions.

"In addition, the low interest rate environment led to lower test rates being used by banks in their affordability assessments. New borrowers were able to borrow more relative to their income than in the past. The share of new lending with high debt-to-income ratios increased as a result.

"LVR restrictions were reinstated in early 2021 at the same level as prior to the pandemic and tightened for investors soon after.

"By mid-2021, house prices reached an unsustainably high level, increasing the probability of a sharp correction in house prices. This, along with continued flows of new high-risk lending, led to a further tightening in LVR restrictions for owner occupiers in November 2021."

The authors say that this period "highlighted the value of having a tool available to contain debt servicing risks in the macroprudential toolkit".

They say that anchoring debt levels to income could have added to borrowers’ resilience to servicing difficulties from higher interest rates, which LVR restrictions were largely unable to do because they target a different type of risk.

"DTI restrictions or a floor on the banks test rates (used in their affordability assessments) are examples of tools that could be used in this regard.

"These tools have since been added to the macroprudential toolkit. We have also recently published a framework for DTI restrictions and banks are preparing their systems so that they could be activated from April 2024."

We welcome your comments below. If you are not already registered, please register to comment.

Remember we welcome robust, respectful and insightful debate. We don't welcome abusive or defamatory comments and will de-register those repeatedly making such comments. Our current comment policy is here.

26 Comments

'They say that anchoring debt levels to income could have added to borrowers’ resilience to servicing difficulties from higher interest rates, which LVR restrictions were largely unable to do because they target a different type of risk.

"DTI restrictions or a floor on the banks test rates (used in their affordability assessments) are examples of tools that could be used in this regard."'

Good to see this spelt out - it's been misunderstood on this site quite frequently by those who think LVRs are sufficient. 

Up
6

Look at all the listed property vehicles, all have and LVR and an Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR).

It’s that simple, you need both.

Up
5

Such clowns..

And there are clowns that think house prices are still sustainable at these lofty levels.. there are still so many on the low rates with high debt,  that will start to roll over in the next 12-15 months 

Up
18

House prices will not be allowed to collapse. Why? It's our short term politics. No party wants it happening on their watch. Are you telling me we don't have it in our capability to build houses en mass? Import builders, scale up supply... all doable if backed by the government.  Real reason? Risk of oversupply and the consequences of a crash. 

Up
5

The house prices will continue its crash after a short pause as in many areas up and down the country only top 10% of earners can afford to purchase average house, investors would be crazy to buy in a falling market especially at 1.2 million with interest rates around 7% maximum rental income would be 50k expenses 84k interest on mortgage payments yearly expenditure needed for house expenses around 12k, out of pocket 46k per year and if prices crash 10% or 20% game over for many investors.

Up
10

House prices in some areas have met Ashley Church's definition of a property market crash.  Has this been reported in the main stream media? 

1) From Ashley Church

"But what constitutes a housing market crash? ...... I define a property market crash as a 20% drop in the median sales price from market peak, and which lasts for more than 12 months."  - https://www.oneroof.co.nz/news/ashley-church-four-reasons-the-housing-m…

2) REINZ median house price changes from peak as at October 2023

Locations where median house prices are down 20% or more from their peak:

1) Auckland: -20.0%
2) Gisbourne: -20.3%
3) Wellington: -20.5%
4) Tasman: -21.6%
5) West Coast: -21.4%

Some areas have now met Ashley's definition of a property market crash.

Remember that for most owner occupiers, the equity deposit is 20%, so for those who bought at or near the peak, most of their equity (which could be their entire lifetime savings) has evaporated in just 2 years. 

Up
7

In real terms add in inflation over last few years in some areas house price’s would be down 35% and now with mortgage rates up around 7% after refinancing some people who have purchased in last two or three years will see huge increases in monthly payments only a matter of time before something breaks in the system.

Up
9

Hence why the Govt will make noises about the high immigration being "unsustainable" but won't actually do anything major to bring it down. Gotta pump the ponzi

Up
6

re ... "Real reason? Risk of oversupply and the consequences of a crash. "

No chance of oversupply. They'll just open the immigration gates again.

And who will benefit? The only people with enough equity to actually own a house, or houses, in the first place.

And who are those people? Predominantly rich, older and white Kiwis. Basically NACTF voters.

Up
5

"House prices will not be allowed to collapse."

That belief led many people to buy residential real estate and to finance their purchase using high amounts of mortgage debt.  Many buyers believed that residential real estate was a riskless one way bet and they were willing to sign mortgage contracts to take on large amounts of debt.

"Capitalism without bankruptcy is akin to Catholicism without hell."
 

Up
6

Here's the full quote from Ben Bernanke's talk today at Brookings: "I think monetary policy is 98% talk and 2% action, and communication is a big part." (He was speaking about his new book: "21st Century Monetary Policy.") Link

Ben Bernanke's Nobel Prize award rewrites the past while darkening future for a single word.

Up
1

This shows you how much they are locked in their own little world, ivory towers.  At the time me and quite a few economists (and others on this site) said "Don't do it! This will be the consequences!" and talked about potential boom of house prices and making the system more fragile.

Why oh why do they take submissions on their upcoming changes, if they aren't going to question their decisions when the submissions lay out what will happen?  Talk about arrogant know-it-alls.

Up
13

May be arrogance.

But at that time I think it was panic. Pure and simple panic.

Surely they all studied the economic effects of the 1918 Spanish flu? It was required reading for one of my papers. (Vastly interesting too.)

 

Up
3

RBNZ actions in April 2020 were proof (if you needed it) that New Zealand's economy is just a housing market with a few other bits bolted on. Recent immigration settings just double down on that. Switch from one idiot policy to another. The real beneficiaries of both policies are the top percentile who own excess land, own rental properties and  employ and resell low cost labour.

Up
26

Unfortunately you are absolutely correct, hence the record immigration numbers. They are trying to sustain the property market by pumping in more people. To hell with those that can’t afford it. You really need to question who the (western) governments work for, certainly not for their citizens. 

Up
10

But ... but ... but ... pub economics goes like this:

1. Interest rates rise
2. House prices fall
3. Building of new houses falls (i.e. sale price < cost + margin)
4. Open immigration gates
5. House prices rise
6. Building of new houses resumes  (i.e. sale price > cost + margin)

Ah. Gotta love pub economics - it never addresses any of the real issues.

Up
0

We may have looked good in the news around the world for a while, but the world has learned of our reliance on housing which strategically can only be a downfall in geopolitics.

Up
1

I wrote to RBNZ in opposition to the proposal to remove LVRs when they started consultation on that, highlighting the potential risks vs the miniscule upsides.

I had a polite response that they were only seeking feedback from the banking sector rather than the general public.

Did they think that the banking sector was going to advocate against removal of a constraint on their business?

On the balance of benefits and risks back then, it was an own goal. Now confirmed as an own goal.

Face meet palm.

Up
18

I remember very clearly the day the announced the removal of LVR’s , I had to hold back from throwing something at the tele! (clearly not the tv’s fault). It was plain as day what that decision would cause. I now hold most people in positions of power with utter contempt, until they prove me wrong. They couldn’t have made it any clearer where their allegiance lies, certainly not with the average person in NZ. Only now they admit it may have been a mistake ! Surely they are not that stupid? 

Up
12

Hi David,

Here's the link to the actual doc: 

https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/project/sites/rbnz/files/publications/…

(Your link goes to your D: drive.)

Up
0

Thanks very much. I would like to say that's the first time I've ever done that. (But I might be fibbing.)

Up
1

(warning: black humor)

But look on the plus side ... They'll now be lots of recent mortgagors really struggling for quite a long time so aggregate demand in the economy will be less ... So less demand side inflation pressure for ... I don't know ... Ten years? Maybe twenty?

Up
2

Adrian and Co were the precipice of a one-in-one-hundred year pandemic, and *checks notes* decided that encouraging risky lending was a good response.

 

Far too many organisations viewed COVID as an opportunity to implement changes that would have come under scrutiny in normal times. I suspect Adrian wanted the LVRs gone, and didn't let the crisis go to waste!

 

Up
4

house prices in the US are falling quite quickly... may be nothing.

Up
2

Or maybe a lot ...

GFC 2.0 anyone?

And this time - given how overvalued our houses are - we'll be able to lead the world again.

Mr Orr and the MPC have much to ponder.

Up
0

What's crazy is that lifting the LVRs required like a week of consultation, but reinstating them required months of consultation and forewarning. There is an assumption that removing any regulation/requirement to do something is inherently a good thing, so you shouldn't have to consult as extensively. But look at what impact removing the LVRs had, removing a requirement or simply not doing anything is a policy choice, and we should treat it as such. Investor LVRs should never be relaxed, I understand fhbs and owner occupiers, but I think the past few years have really showed us that house prices aren't just about supply, if you take away a big chunk of the demand (investor-driven), prices will fall. We can't look at supply without also recognising the impact of demand. 

Up
2