Lobbyist and think tank the NZ Initiative is concerned the Reserve Bank's role could 'morph' once it starts using unconventional monetary policies and it might feel required to align itself with the Government's fiscal policy

I'd prefer a sovereign wealth fund to manage council assets than mess around with a huge QE program which will distort the lending market and prop up the asset bubble in residential property.

If you want the RBNZ to butt out and let the bubble burst give this a thumbs up

If you want the RBNZ to keep interferring and let the bubble continue give this a thumbs up

New Zealand's debt market in its current state is probably too small for a QE programme to be effective.
The only way I see this move being remotely successful is if more companies end up issuing long-term bonds for growth funding instead of borrowing from banks.

Wow the Think Tank must have looked around the world what Negative Interest rates have achieved.

10 years in Europe and counting, destroyed the bond market and must buy 50% of ALL GOVT DEBT.

Yep, absolute Failure but hey lets DOUBLE DOWN and go with Orr's joke we have more tools to use.

Yes, the best way to support a capitalist system is to nationalise its assets.

It's interesting to me that reserve banks will tolerate no period of wealth destruction to reorganise the economy ("creative destruction") even when absolutely clear that productivity is falling.

negative interest rates are on the way
that means those of us that have little or no debt but cash or equity will be able to load up on properties
I guess that is one way of stopping house prices from falling

"...There need to be clear rules to govern the RBNZ’s conduct in unconventional circumstances and there must not be the hint that any of the RBNZ’s asset purchases are guided by anything other than its monetary objectives."

Hmmmm....

Quantitative Easing and the Quantity Theory of Credit - Richard Werner

2. The origin and definition of QE
The QTC suggests that neither interest rate reductions nor fiscal expansion, nor reserve expansion, nor structural reforms would be able to stimulate nominal GDP growth. Based on this model I proposed in 1994 and 1995 that a new type of monetary policy be implemented in Japan, which aimed not at lowering the price of money, or expanding monetary aggregates, but at the expansion of credit creation for GDP transactions.4 Since the expression ‘credit creation’ was considered difficult to understand in Japanese, I prefaced the standard Japanese expression for monetary stimulation (‘monetary easing’ or ‘easing’) with the word ‘quantitative’ to declare that ‘Quantitative Easing’, defined as credit creation for GDP transactions, would create a recovery (Werner, 1995). ‘Quantitative easing’, or, in long, ‘quantitative monetary easing’ are literal translations of the Japanese expressions 量的緩和 (ryōteki kanwa) or 量的金融緩和 (ryōteki kinyū kanwa), kanwa, respectively. These expressions had until then not been used to refer to the money supply, bank reserves or deposit aggregates. I suggested in numerous publications that the central bank purchase non-performing assets from the banks to clean up their balance sheets, that the successful system of ‘guidance’ of bank credit should be re-introduced, that capital adequacy rules should be loosened not tightened, and that the government could kick-start bank credit creation and thus trigger a rapid recovery by stopping the issuance of bonds and instead entering into loan contracts with the commercial banks (e.g. Werner, 1998).

My articles caused consternation among economists of diverging schools of thought. The Keynesians, such as Richard Koo, disputed that further monetary stimulation of any kind was needed and that fiscal policy on its own was going to be ineffective. The government listened to Mr Koo, and Japan continued to expand its national debt in massive spending programmes, while credit growth continued to stagnate. So did the economy. Monetarists, such as Peter Morgan or Alan Meltzer, likewise argued that a lack of bank credit was not a problem and ‘quantitative easing’ in the form of credit creation was not needed. Instead, they argued, an expansion in bank reserves at the central bank would do the job. But massive reserve expansions failed to make any impact and due to stagnating bank credit, economic growth remained well below its potential for most of the following decade and a half. Supply-side economists and proponents of real business cycle models argued that a lack of bank credit could not be the problem — after all, their models did not include banks! I warned during the 1990s that fiscal expansion funded by bond issuance was likely to crowd out private demand, that the expansion of bank reserves would have no impact as idle reserves do not translate into bank credit growth when banks are risk-averse, and that structural reform, if able to increase productivity (which is doubtful) would merely boost potential growth, while Japan’s economy had remained in recession due to a lack of demand. Link and long version

There is a precedent. Hank Paulson of the Treasury and Tim Geithner of the Fed joined hands to indulge in fiscal policy a decade back to pull the US out of the GFC mess. And it worked for them, though at a huge cost to the world and various funds.
May be we can try it at a smaller scale here.
When can I expect the cheque ?

This is such a millennial crisis, NZ and Australia aren't close to recession, house prices are stable, sharemarkets at or near highs, unemployment is 5% and credit is still flowing. Yet here we are with cash rates at 1% and RBA/RBNZ both considering QE & negative rates. It's all a bit surreal, like we can't dare allow the snowflakes to be triggered by a recession.

If you're going to blame anyone blame the banks and by default John Key because he is a banker. As we saw with the subprime wipe out and soveriegn debt crisis the banks engineer the whole thing to A. Inflate the value of assets with easily obtained debt then B. at a certain point in time trigger a collapse of that assets price by scaremongering a panic, which leaves the owner indebted and inevitably sees the asset move into the banks balance sheet under liquidation. The NZI is the old business roundtable and they won't like this RBNZ idea one bit because it threatens their ability to sow the seeds for creative destruction or in other words the opportunity to make lots of money out of anothers misfortune is looking less likely if the rbnz gets into its stride.

Heaven forbid a government monetary institution should act in such a way to support democratically chosen public purpose. What an outrage.

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Perhaps we should look at somewhere more successful for useful ideas rather than adopt the intellectually bankrupt ideas of the failing major powers. Singapore monetary policy, based on running a slightly positive current account balance, perhaps.

The point of the quote is that our monetary structure has been a key part of the decline in our living standards, causing us to argue amongst ourselves over who to blame. The issue is a structural one which "impoverishes many, but enriches a few" as Keynes put it.